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The occasion for this thesis deserves brief mention.
Several years ago Captain Carl A. Auel of the United
States Navy Chaplain Corps embarked on a study to assess
systematically Chaplain Corps-sponsored postgraduate train-
ing for active duty chaplains. Several significant dis-
coveries were made. The graduate courses taken by many
chaplains had little direct professional value to the
Corps as a whole; there was little responsible account-
ability by the Corps to the Navy in the systematic monitor-
ing and utilization of that government funded education;
and the Corps had not exercised its legitimate perrogative
of filling its potential graduate billets or in choosing
the areas of study.
The first tangible result of this genuine upgrading
of professional accountability for the Corps was the
selection of ten chaplains in 1977 for five Corps-selected
areas of study, four of these being ethnic studies and the
fifth a study of the ethical/moral issues involved in
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy. Nine of the
ten chaplains were assigned to the ethnic studies, and the
author of this thesis was selected for the fifth (nuclear
weapons) category. The justification for choosing this
subject area was to provide the Chief of Chaplains with

an advisory resource on spiritual and other problems
related to the deployment of nuclear weapons, and ways
for improving ministry to men assigned to nuclear weapons
commands
.
The Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey appeared to
"be the preferred choice of institution for this subject
from several perspectives and, with the gracious and
enthusiastic support of their Department of National
Security Affairs, a strategic planning curriculum was
established with some special modifications to permit the
inclusion of coursework in ethics and the policy sciences.
While exploring the extensive subject matter of
strategic weapons, strategic weapons policy, and a number
of related foreign policy subjects, cannot be described as
a pleasant experience, in the sense that a detailed study
of the present United States strategic position vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union is scarcely an exercise designed to
produce optimism or facilitate sleeping soundly, it has
been a distinct and treasured privilege to be a student in
the National Security Affairs Department. The faculty have
been exceptionally gracious and forebearing with my theo-
logical orientation (line officers are their usual student
fare), and they will be sorely missed. I am especially
indebted to Professor Stephen Jurika, not only for his
stimulating and challenging pedagogy, but his patience in
overseeing the writing of this thesis. My sincere thanks
to Professor William Reese as well (a fellow undergraduate
8

alumnus of the Reed College science program) for his
investment of time as the second reader of the thesis.
In the chapter on the American doctrine of the just
war I am particularly indebted to Professor Robert W.
Tucker's book on the Just War for providing an analytical
framework from which to critique the philosophical problems
in that doctrine as it is held in America. Of several
books on this subject, his was the best in this respect.
Whatever faults in substance or style this thesis
exhibits are mine alone, and whatever merits it may possess
are first and foremost due to the Sovereign Grace of
Almighty God, and secondarily, to the instrumentality of
the NSA Department faculty, several of whom invested much
time and effort in seeking to move my writing style into




. II. AN OVERVIEW
A. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
In its early years, the United States faced many
internal and external threats to its existence that taxed
the courage and ingenuity of the founding fathers. These
problems (especially in foreign relations) were not all
simple ones, or resolved without difficulty, although
admittedly not as complex and dangerous as those facing
our nation today. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence
that men like Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and
John Quincy Adams possessed sufficient philosophical
understanding to adopt a positive, unapologetic stance on
foreign policy which responsibly served the U.S. national
interest without, at the same time, hopelessly alienating
our allies or pandering to our enemies.
A most instructive case is to be found in Hamilton's
defense of President Washington's proclamation of neutrality
on 22 April 1793 > "by which the United States was effectively
removed from involvement in the French Revolution. In his
cogent argument, Hamilton allowed that there were three
moral principles which argued for U.S. support of France,
namely, "faithfulness to treaty obligations, gratitude
towards a country which had lent its assistance to the
colonies in their struggle for independence, and the
10

1affinity of republican institutions ..." . Yet, against
these Hamilton demonstrated that the national interest,
fundamentally on the basis of self-preservation - which is
the first duty of any nation - could not permit involve-
ment of the infant republic in a European war. He further
averred that individual morality is not precisely the
same as that which exists between nations; and hence, the
application of ethical principles to actual behavior is
often different for nations than for individuals. Gratitude
is a case in point, and the gratitude which the United
States presumably entertained towards France did not
justify imperilling the new nation in a cause of question-
able virtue and great risk.
The United States was founded by the first generation
of statesmen who were able to formulate a concept of the
national interest which could effectively distinguish in
its foreign policy between moralistic concerns--and even
pretensions--and the duty of a nation to survive. That
this discernment and competence largely has been lost by
the U.S. government and administration policy makers is so
obvious as to need little comment. What is of concern
here is why that change took place, what are its effects,




B. CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA
The intellectual underpinnings of political thought at
the time of the Declaration of Independence came primarily
from the Reformation and, to a lesser degree, from the
Enlightenment. In their own way, both of these great
intellectual stirrings had contributed to the formation
of political thought in America and, combined with the
uniqueness of the American experience, provided a yeasty
ferment of contrasting and conflicting ideas, some of which
were to have profound consequences for United States
foreign policy. The connection between the two goes as
far back as the 1700 's in the thinking of men like John
Locke, Samuel Rutherford, and John Witherspoon, who was
the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence.
Witherspoon had taken Rutherford's excellent political
work entitled Lex Rex; The Law is King , and applied its
principles to the writing of the Constitution. His
thesis was that there could be freedom without chaos because
there was form, based upon a Creator God who Himself cannot
change, and whose universe bears endless witness to order,
control, and truth. Here was a government of law rather
than by the arbitrary decisions of ologarchs or despots.
Put it another way, when the Bible (as the Word of God,
and hence, the final authority for men in matters of faith,
life, and society) is respected by the rulers, the governed





Even though Rutherford' s work had a great influence
on the content of the United States Constitution, he is
largely forgotten by most modern Anglo-Saxons. Perhaps
his greatest contribution to political theory and practice
was the concept of checks and balances in government.
Because Rutherford held to the Biblical principle that man
had an inherently sinful nature, he recognized that man,
collectively or individually, simply did not possess the
ability and will to police his own actions. Both individ-
uals and governments, therefore , need others to oversee and
measure their behavior against absolute Biblical standards
for personal and civic rectitude.
By the mid 1800' s, however, this finely honed theocen-
tric cosmology had been corrupted by the dual effects of
humanism and the deism of the Enlightenment. While God
was not yet openly rejected, for all practical purposes
He had become irrelevant, especially as the epistemological
basis for understanding the realms of science and humanity.
Hand in hand with the gradual rejection of belief in the
inspiration and veracity of Scripture came the gradual
rejection of basic biblical truths (such as the sinful
nature of man) . It is impossible for man to sever himself
completely from his past. Societies cannot do that either,
and certain Biblical principles and values were "maintained"
within our culture (at least to the extent of lip service)
even after it no longer believed in the trustworthiness of
Scripture as the only rule of faith and practice and the
13

document of Divine revelation. It was not uncommon to
find Americans who claimed sincere commitment to the ten
commandments as the basic guide for their life (though
most would have been sorely pressed to state them) and
yet could argue, strongly, that the Bible was full of
error, and subject to all manner of private interpretation.
My belief is that the last generation to hold these
contradictory positions— to any significant extent—were
the men and women who served, fought, and died in World
War II. For them, the combination of victory, patriotism
and driblets of historic Christianity seemed to provide a
sufficient life and world view. Their children, the high
school and college students of the 1960's, having no better
alternatives, and resorting to drugs and other forms of
subjective experientialism en masse, could and did see the
fundamental hypocrisy of giving lip service to a faith long
dead. While this does not imply that the rebellious
generation of the 1960's was somehow "better" or "wiser",
they were the first to reject the last vestiges of the
tremendous momentum which Christianity had given to
American culture after the War of Independence, and which
had continued, even after the Bible had been set aside as
its basis, to exert a major influence on several generations
of Americans. Put quite simply, America has entered the
post-Christian era and Americans have largely lost the
ability to understand or use the great Biblical principles
which provided a strong foundation for the political theories
and decisions of this nation's founders.
14

There are several other key "strands" which have
contributed to the present philosophical, spiritual and
social malaise in America. The most significant of these
is the Humanism of the enlightenment.
Before and during the French Revolution humanistic
thinkers had an extensive impact upon Western philosophy
despite the failure of that revolution to live up to its
expectations. And, in America, its effects were seen first
among the university educated, the seminaries, and the
clergy.
The Utopian dream of humanism can he summed up in
five words: reason, nature, happiness, progress, and
liberty. Man was seen as beginning—absolutely—with
himself, and the final divorce of epistemology from the
being God took place when Rene Descartes declared his first
metaphysical principle to be "cogito ergo sum" (a blas-
phemous parody of the first and greatest epistemological
text in the Bible, "I AM who I AM"). 2
This was the complete antithesis of Reformation
thought. It rested upon a different foundation, it stood
for absolutely different principles, and it ultimately
produced disastrous results for humanism. No longer was
man to live and work lovingly and humbly for the glory of
God. Now as the perfectible center of his own universe,
his only task was to perfect that society with the tools
of reason in the realms of science and philosophy. Among
the cognoscente, Christianity became indistinguishable
15

from deism, and regarded as something tolerable for those
who, having failed to make the grade intellectually, were
still bound by the shackles of religious superstition.
However, it was the humanists who had donned the
shackles, not the Biblical theologians. Beginning with
man alone, humanists have failed to arrive at universals or
absolutes, which alone can give lasting meaning to existence
and moral values. Of course, it took several generations
of concerted scientific and philosophical effort to dis-
cover that this was so, but by the mid-1900' s there were
no humanistic philosophers left who were optimistic about
mankind.-^ The methodology of Western philosophy had
degenerated largely into sophisticated argumentation about
semantics, and its poverty stricken content into sheer
anthropocentrism. Existentialism became philosophy's
logical dead-end, and the culture of despair, suicide and
self-abuse thus had not only an intellectually respectable
basis for its cynicism, but also was reinforced by an
institutional church; a structure which had sold its soul
for the husks of intellectual food that denied the eternal
and invisible for the mundane and palpable. The majority
of American Churchmen no longer believe in a supernatural
God whose name they still use. The highest and holiest
of human institutions (the family and the church) have
been degraded and destroyed with their concurrence, The
civil government, which should be the servant and protector
of the people is becoming their oppressor and robber and
16

we, as a people, appear to be lacking direction or
purpose. Our attempts to legislate righteousness into
society, and to solve the social consequences of our sin-
ful nature with makeshift bureaucratic programs have ended
in costly failures. There is an ironic twist in all this.
Even after the great social welfare programs of the 50'
s
and 60's were recognized as failures, the internal momentum
and security of these new and vast bureaucracies had be-
come so great that no government effort has been able to
terminate their parasitic existence.
Because we have rejected even the possibility of the
existence of absolute standards, we are less able to
function effectively in major governmental decision-making
than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They, at
least, hold to an ideology (however corrupt and unworkable
in practice), and for that reason have a sense of purpose
which has enabled them to move steadily (if not always
successfully) toward well-defined domestic and international
goals.
Because we have rejected Biblical truths, we have had
to fill the void left by their removal with half truths and
outright illusions. For example, if man is good, he
presumably won't act in an evil way if properly enlightened
according to the standards of the public educational
system. Since the United States is an enlightened populist
democracy, therefore we will not consciously choose to do
anything, as a nation, that is "bad." The duty to protect
17

our national existence, and the right to confront internal
and external challenges to that existence, is Biblical
through and through; but, rejecting that, we are embarrassed
by our power, for liberal humanism has decreed that the
use and possession of power is "bad", especially if it is
military power.
Reinhold Niebuhr has put the matter clearly:
Modern man's confidence in his power over
historical destiny prompted the rejection of every
older conception of an overruling providence in
history. Modern man's confidence in his virtue
caused an equally unequivocal rejection of the
Christian idea of the ambiguity of human virtue.
In the liberal world the evils in human nature
and history were ascribed to social institutions
or to ignorance or to some other manageable de-
fect in human nature or environment. .
,
We were not only innocent a half century ago
with the innocency of irresponsibility; but we
had a religious version of our' national destiny
which interpreted the meaning of our nationhood
as God's effort to make a new beginning in the
history of mankind. Now we are immersed in world-
wide responsibilities; and our weakness has
grown into strength. Our culture knows little
of the use and the abuse of power; but we have to
use power in global terms. Our idealists are
divided between those who would renounce the
responsibilities of power for the sake of preserv-
ing the purity of our soul and those who are
ready to cover every ambiguity of good and evil
in our actions by the frantic insistence that
any measure taken in a good cause must be
unequivocally virtuous. We take, and must
continue to take, morally hazardous actions to
preserve our civilization. We must exercise our
power, but we ought neither to believe that a
nation is capable of perfect disinterestedness in
its exercise, nor become complacent about
particular degrees of interest and passion which
corrupt the justice by which the exercise of power
is legitimized. Communism is a vivid object
lesson in the monstrous consequences of moral
complacency about the relation of dubious means
to supposedly good ends.
18

The ironic nature of our conflict with
communism sometimes centers in the relation of
power to justice and virtue. The communists use
power without scruple because they are under the
illusions that their conception of an unambig-
uously ideal end justifies such use. Our own
culture is schizophrenic upon the subject of
power. Sometimes it pretends that a liberal
society is a purely rational harmony of interest.
Sometimes it achieves a tolerable form of
justice by a careful equilibration of the powers
and vitalities of society, though it is without
a conscious philosophy to justify these policies
of statesmanship. Sometimes it verges on that
curious combination of cynicism and idealism
which characterizes communism, and is prepared
to use any means without scruple to achieve its
desired end.^
To put it briefly, we are our own worst enemy. Having
no means to eliminate the excruciating guilt arising from
the inevitable recognition of our national mistakes and
personal sins, we find it impossible to face honestly,
because we believe we are truly virtuous. As a result we
see the often unconscious but growing tendency to make
self-destructive decisions; whether at the highest levels
of government, individually, or as part of one of the cults
whose appeal is primarily to the intellectually and
spiritually poverty stricken.
We appear to be searching frantically for a workable
national policy, filled with dismay at ineffectual and
indecisive national leadership, yet loathing the idea that
the only answer is to be found in the person and principles
of a righteous and holy Creator.
The dismal contribution of the institutional churches
to this tragic process of decay in the national purpose is
too great to be only partially mentioned. It consists of
19

at least two major strands. The first of these - the
denial of Biblical absolutes, and hence the God who gave
the Scriptures - has already been discussed. But another
misuse of their holy calling has been woven just as
deeply into the fabric of American political and social
tradition.
In the early years, when the colonies were concentrated
along the eastern seaboard, the quality of education and
training possessed by most of the clergy, Protestant and
Roman Catholic alike, was generally high indeed, very high
by educational standards of the day. Sermons were sub-
stantive and usually Biblical, and the people were generally
knowledgeable about Scriptural principles of conduct.
Historical evidence indicates a significant degree of
responsible balance in the application of Biblical standards
to daily life among a sizable portion of the populace.
When the nation began to expand westward with new
communities springing up by the hundreds, a critical short-
age of ministers rapidly developed.
Once the questions of basic survival no longer
occupied all the energies of everyone in a new community,
many of the members of those frontier settlements turned
to spiritual concerns, and to building places for worship.
This desire to listen to the Word of God, and enjoy other
pastoral services, generated a growing demand for ministers.
Existing seminaries, of which Princeton Theological
Seminary was the undisputed leader, simply could not meet
20

the demand, even when the few graduates were supplemented
by experienced ministers from Great Britain and Holland.
As the need became greater the demand for quality diminished,
expecially in frontier towns, where the townfolk tended
to be less well educated and less critical of pastoral
deficiences than those in established, eastern cities.
The "solution" eventually came from a quarter other
than the seminaries. The Methodist churches, which already
had a tradition of ministry among the lower classes in
England, undertook to ordain 'lay' preachers who were
usually commissioned to serve more than one congregation.
Thus the famous "circuit rider" came to America - but with
a difference. Men who committed themselves to this arduous
service rode horseback often for days at a time, usually
lived frugally and dangerously in frontier areas, and
established a reputation for pastoral concern that would
elicit admiration even today. What is often forgotten is
that these men were nearly always minimally educated, and
sometimes illiterate. Frequently their sermonic repertoire
consisted of from one to six memorized exhortations, with
little in the way of substantive theology to back up their
preaching. Experience - particularly a dramatic, personal
experience - assumed a dominate place in the popular religious
thought of the day as the ultimate criterion by which one
determined whether or not he entered the celestial kingdom.
Objective criteria of genuine conversion and assurance,
spelled out in Scripture, ceased to be important, and if
21

the conversion experience of the 'seeker 1 included the
repudiation of, and turning away from, the evils of drink,
blasphemy, etc., no greater joy could befall pastor and
congregation.
As a result of this change in emphasis, the circuit-
rider ministry became institutionalized and constricted
in its sermons and larger pastoral ministry. Hand in hand
with a diminishing interest in theology came the increased
concentration on simplistic prohibitions within the social
sphere
.
In the rough and ready anti-intellectualism of a rural
frontier community, such a downgrading of the Gospel of
redemptive grace into moralistic "do's and don'ts" usually
went unrecognized, and often had some social usefulness.
Town and villages in that environment tended to divide
into two sub-groups, the church-goers and the saloon-goers.
The former generally felt superior to the latter and looked
down on them because they themselves didn't drink, swear,
carouse, or gamble. The saloon-goers despised the church
goers for their sissified self righteousness, and rational-
ized their own behavior on the basis that at least it wasn't
hypocritical
.
The 'effectiveness' of social morality with a Christian
veneer rested largely in the tremendous community pressure
which could be brought to bear upon anyone who deviated from
the straight and narrow, in a situation where everybody
knew everybody else and everybody else's business.
22

This identification of social conformity with Biblical
redemption thus became a major factor in the establishment
of the traditional American notion that Christian morality
consists mainly of vague unhappy and sour prohibitions
against improper behavior and pleasures. Along with the
repudiation by theologians and academicians of the authority
and inspiration of Scripture this reinforced the vague
assumption that being a good (American) citizen constituted
sufficient justification for admission into heaven, or at
least into God's graces.
By the early 1900 's the great truth of redemption by
the grace of God (accomplished in the finished work of
Jesus Christ) was rapidly disappearing from the teaching of
most churches. The need for divine pardon for indwelling
and committed sins, and the assurance of forgiveness,
appeared mysterious and archaic when ranged alongside the
dominant idea of the innate goodness of mankind, and the
overriding importance of social reform.
Although other contributory elements could be identified,
these are the preeminent religious sources of the widespread
and fuzzy American notion of morality and Christianity,
which recently has come to be called (quite perceptively)
"civic religion".
One of the more far reaching effects of this kind of
traditionalism eventually found its way into the field of
U.S. foreign policy. As Christianity became confused with
good citizenship in the popular mind (abetted by political
23

rhetoric at election times) , the next logical step was to
assume that it was the duty of every patriotic American to
spread the gospel of the American dream. Evidence of the
proselytizing zeal of those who muddled these separate
realms of responsibility can be seen in the activities of
some 19th. century U.S. missionaries. It was not uncommon
for Protestant missionaries to convert the foreign heathen
as much to American Victorian culture as to the Christian
gospel. Indeed, as the years passed, the tendency grew
to emphasize democratic government, personal hygiene,
sanitation, good methods of argiculture, modest dress, and
the capitalistic economic system almost exclusively. Pearl
Buck, a missionary of the Presbyterian Church in China in
the 1930' s, was an archetypal example who not only repudiated
the unique Biblical message, but transmuted its calling
into an effort to uplift the Chinese by exposing them to a
distinctly American value system.
Because the United States had not faced the great
problems Europe did during and after the Industrial
Revolution; because of the remarkable and largely unhindered
progress in expanding westward, and building a strong
economy involving the middle class; most Americans assumed
that God had blessed them because they were "good" - that
is, they had not sunk to the political evils of the
Europeans
.
Thus was laid the foundation for the greatest presump-
tion of all, the American messianic calling, which engendered
Zk

all the zeal among its adherents of missionaries converting
the heathen in centuries past. Only this time the gospel
was the gospel of free enterprise, hard work, individualism
in short, the American way of life - that had to be carried
to the far corners of the earth.
Humanism, and a degenerate religion provided the
philosophical impetus for the decay of mature statecraft
in the United States. Technology and the cosmology of
scientism were the tools.
Prior to 1912, Western scientific effort had been
spectacularly successful. Diseases centuries old were
being conquered, improvements in transportation and
communications were breathtaking, and researchers believed
they were close to unlocking secrets of the universe that
would permit even greater breakthroughs. An intuitively
satisfactory hypothesis had been invented which provided
an acceptable alternative to the distasteful idea of
creation for explaining man's origin, and many churchgoers
believed that they had found the explanation for Biblical
miracles in scientific phenomonology, thereby removing
the embarrassing problem of the supernatural in a world
where the natural was supreme
.
The optimism was so catching that an entire school
of eschatology (postmillenialism) was developed to explain
how the promised millenium on earth would be realized
through the instrumentality of scientific progress.
25

The nexus of These ideas and circumstances was nebulous
but the net effect was to provide for many sufficient
evidence that a new age was dawning. This, combined
with the fact that there had been no major European war
for nearly a century, led many to sincerely believe that a
genuine change had come - that civilization was becoming
civilized. Enlightened scientific humanism was fulfilling
the promise of a better social order for mankind - one
in which war, disease, poverty and ignorance would at
last be abolished - something that Christianity had never
been able to accomplish.
In 1912, this psychological bubble was punctured when
the latest mechanical wonder of the infallible new science,
the Titanic, sank; for it had been proclaimed unsinkable
.
By the end of that terrible experience, the bright optimism
of the 19th. century was gone, and western man suspected
that the advancements, inventions and discoveries of science
could be a two-edged sword.
It took a second World War - even more horrible in its
carnage, the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, the
extension of the violence of war to noncombatant civilians
on an unprecedented scale, and the atomic bomb to complete
the disillusionment of the most ideologically optimistic
.
World War II showed us that we, too, were capable of evil,
and it was a shock for many Americans to discover that
we were capable of violence and cruelty. It was almost as
shocking after the war to discover that not all the countries
26

which had experienced the presence of U.S. troops were
delighted to have had them.
For a people who need the constant reassurance of love
and approval from others to convince themselves that their
messianic ideology and role is valid, signs of disagreement,
disapproval or outright rejection can be unnerving, and
result in great uncertainty of purpose. The problem with
being a messiah is that messiahs are supposed to be sinless
redeemers. Messiahs don't commit evil, and the necessity
of doing some things in foreign policy that are obviously
not pristine in all respects has served to generate con-
fusion and anxiety in the American breast. We have often
acted expediently, sometimes harshly, and sometimes un-
righteously in our foreign relations. This strikes at
the very heart of the humanistic presumption of the perfect-
ibility of man. It is an unanswerable challenge to the
social redemption assumed to be an intrinsic characteristic
of the American experience. Having diplomatic relations
with national leaders and their governments that do not
possess or promote the democratic way of life seems somehow
immoral, and wrong unless an ongoing effort is made to
change the offending state into our image and likeness.
The exception to this rule is, of course, totalitarian
communist states, towards which we manifest a curious
silence and an unwillingness to critize or object to their
repressive systems especially if they are superpowers.
27

Just as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
is obsessed with demonstrating to the world its total
rectitude in all its dealings in every area, we too have
shackled ourselves to a hopelessly unobtainable goal -
that of achieving corporate righteousness in all our
domestic and foreign activities. The standard of righteous-
ness is the old humanistic composite ideal of equal
happiness, progress, liberty for all and, since these are
basically good, all therefore deserve equal reward.
Our problem is compounded for us in a way that not
even the CPSU must face, for we have no hard theoretical
basis (false or true is not the issue) for self justifica-
tion, as do the Marxists. We try to demonstrate consensus
of values in many ways but that, too, is an exercise in
frustration because it is impossible to attain a solid
consensus in a society that glorifies pluralistic and
individualistic liberties as necessary expressions of
the innate goodness of political man! Consequently we
seek majority opinions in areas that may seem related,
however fuzzily, to the values of rampant humanism.
President Carter's "human rights" idea is a tragic example
of a naive and immature notion trying to wear the clothes
of a mature ideology, and finding them too big. Given
its almost total lack of any philosophical substance it is
not terribly surprising that it has virtually disappeared
from his political rhetoric in spite of the verbal




Trying to make mankind into his own god has failed
the human philosophy dismally. We are disillusioned, and
tempted to hopelessness. Pragmatism, scientism, technolog-
ical materialism , capitalism, intellectualism, hedonism,
political and social activism, mass education, civic
religion and patriotism have all failed to fill the void as
a workable national ideology. The product of this historic
process of degeneration is the loss of a sense of national
purpose so great that our foreign and domestic policy
decisions are foredoomed to be reactive, since the embar-
rassed, the guilty, the insecure and the undertain will
invariably accomodate the aggressive and purposeful, our
dealings with the Russians and Chinese at all levels have
been characterized by appeasement, fear of offending, and
timid hopefulness that expressions of moral outrage (not
based on moral principles, only fuzzy traditional assump-
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III. ETHICS AND WAR
A. THE JUST WAR ISSUE
The basic ethical problem in any study of warfare is
the very difficult matter of the "just war." For centuries
thoughtful men have wrestled with this question, as the
practical implications for a nation are enormous. If a
war is considered to be unjust (rightly or wrongly) by a
significant segment of the populace, the leaders of that
nation may find themselves eventually facing serious, if
not fatal, domestic opposition concerning the conduct
of the war. While purposely making no statement with
respect to the legitimacy of the Vietnam War at this juncture,
it is worthwhile in this context to note this recent example
of the consequences that can accrue to leaders who lose
touch with public opinion about the "just-ness" of a war
in which that country's forces were occupied.
It is important for a government to have some grasp of
the justness (or lack thereof) of a war before entering
upon it in order to arrive at a reasonable projection of
citizen support. It is equally important that possible
long term consequences for the national interest be care-
fully considered. If a country collectively perceives
itself as unethically, unwisely, or mistakenly entering
into a military conflict, that perception can contribute
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to the erosion of confidence in government, lead to
possible internal conflict or even revolution and, at
worst, national collapse.
Because warfare is the in extremis test of national
will, unity and strength, it is all the more important
that warfare not be undertaken lightly. But, if it is
engaged in, then it should be done so only with the utmost
care, in order that the core values which hold that nation
together are not eroded or destroyed by the involvement.
As soon as the issue of the just war is raised, it
generates a definitional problem. What does "just" mean?
Presumably, in any context other than that of Orwellian
"doublethink" the concept of "just," or justice, must be
based upon an underlying set of social values and related
to some code of law. If that lawcode permits the develop-
ment of workable definitions of "lawful" and "unlawful"
with respect to the cause and/or conduct of a war, then
it can be determined whether the war is just or not, in a
legal sense. But it is impossible to arrive at a more
systematic definition, and hence concept, of a just (or
unjust) war without a societal value system upon which the
working lawcode is based.
It is important to remember that the legal sense of a
just war, and the moral sense of what is a just war are
most likely not identical, and may be significantly
different. They should not be confused. Indeed, this
distinction is true in the wider sense. What an ethical
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system, such as that derived from Biblical theology, may
deem good or evil, a law system may view in the opposite
way. American law in the 1970* s declares that abortion,
with certain restrictions, is lawful, based upon an
ideological and social assumption of what is good for the
mother. In a legal sense, then, it is not bad. If it is
not bad, then it is presumably good. Yet Scripture, by
good and necessary inference, forces the admission that
abortion is evil at any stage of pregnancy, and unless
survival of the mother or child is clearly impossible
(e.g. tubular pregnancy) its commission constitutes murder.
So in the matter of warfare, legal concepts of justness
may fail to agree with ethical definitions of what is just.
In World War II Germany took a number of actions in the
name of "military necessity" which were viewed by people
in other societies as atrocities or war crimes. Within the
German system of law they were just. Within the Judeo-
Christian ethical system generally accepted in Western
Europe at the time, their conduct was regarded as unjust,
for the most part. Within the system of international
law as it was developed at that time, some of their actions
were viewed as just, and some as unjust. And within the
lawcodes of the different countries Germany invaded,
different perceptions existed about which actions were
just or unjust in the legal sense.
Furthermore, certain societies may be more inclined to
view the justness of a war from a legal perspective, others
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more directly from a perspective of the ethical values
held by that society. The United States is one of the
most litigious societies in the modern world, and accordingly
tends to view the question of the just war more exclusively
7from a legal standpoint.
If a given society is uncertain about its values, that
perceptual fuzziness may be tolerable in times of peace
and economic prosperity. But war, unless it is minor
and short term, draws heavily on a nation's human, material,
intellectual and spiritual resources, and in crisis the
absence of a widely accepted value system can be disastrous,
because the law code will not govern the conduct of that
war. Why do values, and warfare, always get so tangled in
the end? Primarily, because war involves not only the use
of violence, loss of human lives, and the destruction of
valuable property, but also the intense, and life-changing
involvement of many individuals in large and complex military
organizations. War strikes at the heart of most, if not
all, of the values which hold a nation and civilized
society together. Even if a soldier is not killed in
battle, he can emerge from the experience emotionally and
spiritually devastated; and if an entire generation of a
nation's youth is so affected the course of that nation's
history can be profoundly altered.
Furthermore, war, as no other instrumentality in the
human experience, forces large numbers of people to make
agonizing moral choices which do not occur in peacetime.
3^

A classic example is the military commander who determines
that he must "sacrifice" a certain number of his men in
order to gain some overall objective that presumably will
gbenefit all his forces later on.
Consequently, a nation which does not have a widely
held understanding of, and agreement about, those values
upon which its code of law is based, or an understanding of
how to operationalize those values in its system of law, is
asking for disaster should it embark upon a major war.
Most individuals function relatively well on a day-
to-day basis in a non-crisis environment, even if they are
confused about the values that govern their conscious
and subconscious choices. But it is the catastrophic
nature of war which generates the type of crisis situations
in which individuals must make such profound, difficult,
and awesomely accountable moral choices. If they have
never consciously examined or exercised their "ethical
muscles," there is the likelihood that they will find
themselves out of their depth in such circumstances, and
unable to act wisely. Rather, the tendency would be to
react viscerally on the basis of trivial or irrelevant
considerations, sometimes ruthlessly or immorally, or
to retreat to intellectual and spiritual paralysis, wait-
ing for someone else to do their thinking for them.
For these reasons, the issue of the "just war" is no
mere intellectual game for ivory tower intellectuals, but
one of the most vital matters that can occupy the attention
35

of responsible national leaders; one that can be avoided
or ignored only at the peril of that society's existence.
There is one apparent exception to this claim, namely,
a dictatorship, which can wage war without the same kind
of consensus required in a democracy. However, it appears
reasonable to argue that the exception is only apparent,
for even dictatorships require a degree of consent by the
governed, if only by default, or at least enough of the
governed who occupy the lower rungs of the dictatorship
power structure. Thus, a dictatorial decision to go to
war represents the existing operational reality of central
control for virtually all life under a dictatorship
—
where decision is by autocratic determination, not
consensus
.
Because war always deeply involves the basic values
necessary to men's existence, it is not particularly
surprising that the justifications for war pertain to those
areas in which basic human values most often find expression,
particularly the religious, political, or the instinct for
self-preservation.
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find
examples where leaders have taken their nations to war
without attempting to justify it to their citizens. ( Again-
-
an apparent exception is when a nation is the object of a
surprise attack by an enemy). This is, of course,
reasonable^ since people in every culture tend to sense the
inherent and unknown peril involved in going to war, and
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particularly, that a war can destroy everything dear to
them, including their own lives. Consequently, when
people are asked to face sacrifices of that magnitude,
they need (with very few exceptions) a fairly significant
degree of motivation to do so.
Of the three categories of justification suggested,
that of national (and individual) survival is the easiest
to use if the populace clearly sees the external threat
to its continued existence. Both religious and political
considerations will fall into line behind this banner, for
nearly all religions inherently support the right of
adherents to continue living, and to defend themselves in
some way for that purpose. Politically, any leader who,
in the eyes of his people appeared to resist the right of
a legitimate state to protect itself from external threat
would be regarded as committing the ultimate political
sin--namely treason. Political justification, too, would
be secondary to that of elementary survival.
Political and/or religious justification will invariably
be involved where the threat to national existence, or to
individual survivial, is not well-defined or obvious.
Furthermore, the reasons offered for entering into
belligerency prove to be a curious mixture of political
and religious justification, and the United States is no
exception to this phenomenon.
Having addressed briefly the basic considerations which
compel nations to develop some concept of the "just war" it
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is appropriate to examine the American doctrine of the
just war, and in particular, the problems inherent in its
development and structure.
B. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF THE JUST WAR: AN ASSESSMENT
Every nation is strongly inclined to view the world
through the lens of the particular interpretation it has
given to its own domestic history, and America has been
no exception to this strikingly constant pattern. The
slant of our perceptions of things foreign clearly reflects
interpretive insights which we have applied to our beginnings
and development as a nation. Robert W. Tucker has noted,
There is an apparent simplicity about the
American doctrine of the just war that readily
lends it to caricature. Undoubtedly the most
striking characteristic of this doctrine is its
simplicity. The American doctrine is distinguished
by the assumption that the use of force is clearly
governed by universally valid moral and legal
standards; it is distinguished further by the
insistence with which these standards are inter-
preted as making the justice or injustice of war
primarily dependent upon the circumstances
immediately attending the initiation of force.
In substance, the just war is the war fought either
in self-defense or in collective defense against
an armed attack. Conversely, the unjust--and, of
course, the unlawful--war is the war initiated in
circumstances other than those of self or collective
defense against armed aggression.
This singular preoccupation with the overt
act of resorting to force has its counterpart in
the lack of concern shown toward the causes that
have led to war; whatever the nature of these
causes, they cannot be regarded as providing a
justification for the initiation of war. 10
A second key element in the American doctrine of the
just war is that there are no grievances, circumstances, or
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necessities in the realm of foreign affairs which can
ever justify the expediency of initiating a war, presumably
to redress those grievances.
A third concept, deeply interwoven with these two, is
that aggressive warfare is always unlawful. When a war is
unlawful, it is also unjust in the American philosophy.
The elevation of legal rectitude as the ultimate standard
of moral conduct became well established in the American
tradition concurrently with the rejection of the Bible as
the highest and first source of ethics and moral rightous-
ness. Justice and law became synonymous, with legality
of behavior often regarded as being the essence of morality
The chief American prosecutor at the International
Military Tribunal at Nurenburg reflected these assumptions
in his opening address before that body:
"Our position is that whatever grievances a
nation may have, however objectionable it finds
that status quo , aggressive warfare is an illegal
means for settling those grievances or for alter-
ing those conditions. "
H
The fourth concept in the American doctrine of the just
war is that force (violence) can never be a legitimate
instrument of national policy. John Foster Dulles artic-
ulated this idea in his 1956 address to the United Nations
Assembly at the time of the Suez Crisis, observing that,
"If we were to agree that the existence of in-
justice in the world, which this organization so
far has been unable to cure, means that the principle
of renunciation of force is no longer respected and
that there still exists the right wherever a nation
feels itself subject to injustice, to resort to
force to try to correct that injustice, then. . .
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we would have, I fear, torn this Charter into
shreds and the world would again "be a world of
anarchy. "12
It should be apparent that this doctrine, if pushed to
the limits of its application, must necessarily lead to
the absolute repudiation and condemnation of preventive
war, or any policy espousing it. There is a strong im-
plication that there never can be a situation in which the
national interest could be best served by undertaking a
"lesser" evil in order to preclude a far greater evil
later on.
This view seriously oversimplifies the issue of what
constitutes a preventive war, and from what perspectives
it is judged. From a strictly military standpoint, a
preventive war is aggressive only in the technical sense
that the first blow is strictly to initiate hostilities
and to gain a crucial tactical or strategic advantage, but
may not necessarily be aggressive for much of the remainder
of the war. From a political standpoint, a preventive war
is initiated to prevent the sacrifice of one or more vital
interests of the nation, which could conceivably jeopardize
its very existence if actually sacrificed.
The issue of aggression, seen from this perspective,
applies only to the choice of the most propitious moment
for initiating what is considered to be, politically, a
necessary defense of the national interest.
If one concedes any validity at all to these two
possible qualifications, then the issue of the immorality
^0

of initiating conflict ceases to be the ethical touchstone
for determining the morality of a given war. Rather, the
question becomes one of determining if the interests a
nation seeks to defend are legitimate; whether the threats
to a nation's security are real, and if so, their gravity
and scope; and if the wide spectrum of costly consequences
which can reasonably be expected to follow from the resort
to force have been honestly and carefully considered. The
justness of a preventive war must be sought in the causes
of the war, the objectives for employing force, and the
manner in which force is used.
Given the American social and historical context, there
are grave problems associated with even the theoretical
consideration of the possibility of employing a preventive
war, and the assumed moral problems are among the most
serious that would be raised. Even if enemy intent is
unambiguous, opponents of preventive war would certainly
raise strong moral objections based on the aforementioned
doctrinal assumptions.
Yet, apart from a purely pacifist position,
preventive war as a possible instrument of policy
cannot be excluded on moral grounds alone save by
a doctrine which insists upon identifying the
justice or injustice of war with the acts immediately
attending the initiation of force. For this
doctrine preventive war is not only aggressive war
in the technical military sense; it is also aggres-
sive war in the moral sense and as such unjust.
Because preventive war implies condoning the
resort to war by a state in circumstances other
than those of self or collective defense against
armed aggression, it signifies the acceptance of
war as an instrument of national rather than of
international policy. Preventive war must there-
fore be condemned, whatever the circumstances that
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are alleged to condition its initiation and
however unambiguous these circumstances may
appear. Thus President Truman in setting forth
the aims of American policy during the Korean
conflict declared: "We do not believe in
aggressive or preventive war. Such war is the
weapon of dictators, not of free democratic coun-
tries." The very idea of preventive war, in the
words of Dean Acheson, "is a thoroughly wicked
thing. . .immoral and wrong from every point of
view." Nor is this position shaken by the con-
viction that the adversary is dedicated to
crushing us, and that he will not be inhibited
in using every means for bringing about this
end. "We shall never choose a war as the
instrument of our policy," John Foster Dulles
declared repeatedly as Secretary of State, even
though "we know that our enemies do not have
moral scruples. In fact, they deny that there is
such a thing as moral law."
Whatever the logical consistency of this
position, the evidence available is impressive
in pointing to the significance of moral conviction
in rejecting the possibility of preventive war
by those who nevertheless remain convinced of the
complete moral depravity of the adversary and of
his fanatic commitment to a deeply hostile
philosophy. To be sure, as a problem for American
policy, preventive war cannot be divorced from the
actual political and military circumstances in
which it has had to be considered. Nevertheless,
it is not obvious that these circumstances have
been uniformly unfavorable to the successful execu-
tion of such a policy. 13
A fifth pillar in the American just war doctrine is
that the idea of preventive war proves the notion of war's
inevitability; and because the idea of the inevitability
of war is anathema in the American tradition (a sixth
element) , it becomes impossible logically to concede that
there could be a just and legitimate preventive war under
any circumstances.
A possible conceptual linkage between the rejection
of preventive war as an acceptable foreign policy element
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and the breezy American tendency to assume that "time is
on our side" is both intuitively pleasing and apparently
open to substantiation from the history of U.S. foreign
policy behavior. If this untested assumption that time is
on our side is accepted as fact, then choosing preventive
war would become stupid as well as immoral. In the 1951
Senate hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson made just this point:
"The basic premise of our foreign policy is
that time is on our side if we make good use of
it."l^
And six years later John Foster Dulles made a similar
assertion without even Acheson' s modest qualification!
"The working hypothesis on which we conduct
our foreign policy is that free governments in
the long run are going to prevail and despotic
governments in the long run are going to go under. "15
In Dulles' s statement can be seen evidence of a seventh
concept peculiar (if not unique) to the American doctrine
of war and statecraft. It is that dictatorial regimes
like the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed to fail in time simply
because they are evil. Conversely, "free" governments
(of which the U.S., of course, is assumed to be a shining
example) are "good", because they recognize and heed the
moral element in "natural law." Hence, disguised somewhat,
is the old American Messianic presumption. We are righteous
because we are moral. We are moral because we keep the law,
and since this kind of lawful good inevitably triumphs
over evil (another widely held assumption) war is not
^3

necessarily inevitable. And if we keep on being "good",
our way will eventually succeed in the face of evil
opposition.
An eight element in the American doctrine of the just
war is our assumed aversion to violence. This is ironic,
for our domestic history has been the scene not only of
much and varied violence but of the willingness to use
violence (i.e. on the frontier) even when other, less
drastic methods might have worked. In a sense, this has
been a masterful exercise in effective folklore, unperturbed
by troublesome historical evidence. We are ambivalent
about the use of violence and force, which suggests that
there are ideological rather than just circumstantial
problems involved. We recognize instinctively that force
is so necessary that we cannot eliminate the means for its
use. It is constantly glorified in our popular culture
and entertainment media, and yet we insist to any who will
listen, that we abhor its use.
Humanistic man must believe that even the worst of
man's evils are not insoluble or inevitable, because man
is basically good, and ultimately perfectible. Therefore,
war— the most terrible of sinful man's symptoms of his
true condition—must be cherished and dogmatized into a
non-inevitable state of being. The result is a classic
case of what modern psychologists call "cognitive dissonance."
We deny that war (and therefore sin) is an inevitable
reality. Yet we know we have been (and are) a violent
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people. The predictable result is intellectual confusion
and unrecognized guilt. Our confusion cannot but include
our uncertainty and impermanence in foreign policy. Our
guilt finds numerous occasions for expression, among which
our politicians seek opportunities to declare the high
morality of our policy choices and actions.
In the actual conduct of warfare, this intellectual
schizophrenia has produced near-disastrous results.
Besides, the depth of our aversion to violence
must be suspect if only because of the curious
ambivalence with which we have viewed, and with
which we continue to view, the instrument of force.
An extreme reluctance to resort to war has not
implied restraint in the manner of employing force
once war has been thrust upon us. This lack of
restraint that we have shown in conducting war—
and the lack of restraint with which we have threatened
to conduct war should it once again be imposed upon
us--has commonly been attributed to the indignation
we feel toward the "agressor" who initially resorted
to armed force. Nevertheless, the explanation of
our behavior by its reference to retributive motives
does not resolve the moral ambiguities of that be-
havior. Still less does it show how that behavior
can be reconciled with an allegedly profound moral
aversion to the methods of violence.
More serious, perhaps, is the consideration that
a profound moral aversion to violence cannot readily
be reconciled with a view that war, even a just war,
may serve as the means for bringing untold blessings
to the world. Yet once we have entered upon war,
there have been few nations more disposed to be-
lieve that history can be radically transformed for
the better through the instrument of unrestrained
violence. And in the nuclear age this belief has
found its expression in a philosophy of deterrence
which optimistically assumes that history can be
radically transformed for the better simply by con-
fronting would-be aggressors with the certainty of
severe punishment in the form of nuclear retaliation
should they seek to carry out their evil designs. 16
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Because our public philosophy in general and our doctrine
of war in particular are so poorly thought out, the direct
and tragic result has "been an increasing willingness to
use exponentially greater violence in order to reduce the
use of force in history! For almost twenty years we have
had an official policy of deterring violence of the ulti-
mate kind imaginable to man (strategic nuclear war) by
the threat of the greatest violence imaginable to man
(strategic nuclear retaliation), while at the same time
continually proclaiming our deep aversion to the use of
force
!
This is not to suggest that the policy of nuclear
deterrence by the threat of massive retaliation was wrong
in all respects or has not worked in the past, but to
highlight that strategic nuclear forces in being under-
scored brilliantly a major philosophical inconsistency in
the American doctrine of the just war. That inconsistency
is not inevitable or unavoidable, but rather reflects the
truth that nations, as individuals, "reap what they sow."
A widespread aversion to theological epistemoloy as the
foundation for a strong and workable public philosophy
has resulted in philosophical chaos and the loss of a
basis for deductive, normative reasoning in numerous areas
of the American experience, not the least of which are our
foreign (and now) strategic policies. We abhor force,
yet spend vast sums to maintain a capacity to use it. We
believe collective force can address security problems
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that national force cannot, yet we do not submit to
collective security when it is clearly not in the best
interests of U.S. national policy.
This contretemps has been exacerbated by our national
lust for simplistic, one-issue solutions to problems
(no matter how complex the problem), and the equally great
passion (especially among the adherents of Scientism) for
technical and technological solutions to every problem
we face. If making more of some new weapon or invention,
if establishing some new program or bureaucracy, will not
resolve a domestic or foreign crisis, we are dismayed, and
unable to perceive other approaches which could be brought
to bear upon the problem. In a sense, we are the genuine
victims of our own past successes in science and humanism,
which seemed to work before the world became the scene of
technological horror.
A telling example of our weakness is seen regularly in
the realm of international relations. Our beatific vision
of a peaceable international world order is one in which
cooperation, rather than conflict, can solve all problems
between nations. It is inseparable from the uniquely
American assumption that all men are equal, or at least
deserving of equality (even though we do not behave that
way domestically or internationally) . We dislike intensely
the i'dea of hierarchy (although we have failed to find a
better substitute), and are pathetically fervent in our
conviction that all men (yes, even the leaders of the
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Kremlin) will respond to the sweet voice of reason, rather
than coercion, if we can but find the right "key" or
"formula" to convert them to our way of thinking.
There is no other systematic or rational explanation
for our observed behavior vis-a-vis the Soviet negotiators
at the SALT bargaining table. Our representatives are
intensely uncomfortable with the Soviet's stony silence,
and continue, in what can only be described as a compulsive
manner, to make concession after concession to the Russians,
in the charming, if deadly, belief that they eventually
will respond in kind. Our persistence and naive faith in
the innate goodness of these men is dicey, and to explain
away the incredible evils of the well-documented ruthlessness
of the C.P.S.U. leadership we use the old sociological
17
and touching assertion that they are victims of a
18
system beyond their control.
Because of the unique place that the use of force has
had in American public philosophy it is very difficult for
most to see it realistically as one segment of a whole
spectrum of incrementally different interactions between
states, beginning with the most amicable of relationships
between old allies, all the way to outright war. This
ideologically motivated, analytical isolation of the
violence of war has made it more difficult to deal with in
a consistent ethical system. Because force ( it is assumed)
is intrinsically and absolutely different from other state
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relationships, there must be clear differences between
the moral issues involved in military force and those in
other types of diplomatic relations.
Again, it is obvious that a certain contribution of
this unrealistic dichotomy must be confusion about per-
ceptions of problems and the choice of appropriate policies
to deal with them. Here too we see the seriousness and
depth of the contradiction between Statecraft in Scripture
and the foreign policy outpourings of the philosophy of
humanisn. Christ declared war to be an inevitable reality
19
of human existence.* In contrast, General Bradley de-
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clared that there "is no such thins; as inevitable war,"
and Secretary Acheson stated that "talk about war being
21inevitable tends to make it so."
Both schools of thought cannot be right. Either Christ
is wrong, or General Bradley and Secretary Acheson are
wrong
.
The result of this thinking is the belief that the
use of military force is totally unnecessary evil. There-
fore, military aggression in another country is the result
of a single evil leader, or ruling clique, who is mislead-
ing (temporarily) a great majority of innocent people. No
other view is possible if this primary article of the faith
is to be maintained, namely, that armed conflict is entirely
avoidable
.
This noble expectation, however far from empirical
reality, provides fertile ground for the endless American
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optimism about eliminating aggression and armed conflict
from this world and further, that the elimination is
entirely possible. Compared to the vast majority of peace-
loving, benign, and cooperative people around the world,
the true aggressors are few in number; and because they
are so few, they must fail in the end.
Thus, if the evil are so few, and the good are so
many, how can the evil minority manipulate so success-
fully the good majority to do their bidding? The obvious
answer often given is that the evil few are so well organized
that they can impose their will on the many. Once again
sociology and organizational theory have provided an
easy answer.
This "answer," seen through the filters of our frontier
experience, becomes analogically complete and President
Truman typically said as much:
"Men who wanted to see law and order prevail
(in the early days of our Western frontier) had to
combine against the outlaws. . . This is just what
we are trying to do today in the international
field. "22
In practice, the problem of separating the innocent
many from the guilty few becomes much more difficult, as
we discovered in the aftermath of our second war with
Germany; nevertheless the distinction has been jealously
maintained, and it is still alive and well today.
After World War II another element of doctrine was
added. Just as a police force is established to deter
crimes of violence in the domestic order (even though it is
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not always successful), so force (preferably collective)
must be used to prevent criminal aggression in the
international order. Here then is yet another contradiction
Our moral philosophy requires that we abhor and repudiate
force as an instrument of national policy, but it admits
of no better way to deter aggression in the international
arena. Of course, collective force must respond to
perceptions of aggression, and threats to national security,
in order to act. Consequently, collective forces can act
only after certain analytical and moral decisions have
been made to employ them. In this light, the great and
naive faith of many U.S. Government officials in the United
Nations is understandable, if not appealing, in the hind-
sight of history. In the marginal situations where overt
hostility was indisputable, but aggression difficult to
categorize, an obvious "out" was to have the General
Assembly resolve this question. In its early years, the
confidence that issues of moral uncertainty could be re-
solved by that body appeared to be an almost perfect
solution to the anxiety created by the disparities between
American doctrine and the necessary steps often required
by the harsh realities of a crisis.
To make the General Assembly the true inter-
preter of the Charter's norms, to elevate that
body from a mere global "town meeting" to the
embodiment of the world's conscience and guardian
of the moral law surely corresponded more to
traditional American sentiments and aspirations than
did the original hierarchical order of power
envisaged by the framers of the Charter. In view
of the commanding position enjoyed by this nation
in the General Assembly during this period, the
51

existing identity of interests between the United
States and at least two-thirds of the members of
the Assembly seemed as good an insurance as could
be expected that a similar identity would prevail
between the dicta of a world's conscience and the
necessities of American policy.
Thus the doubt that might otherwise arise
over whether the use of force in a given instance
conformed to the Charter and to the moral law
would be removed by the General Assembly. 2^
The extent of the internal contradictions of the just
war doctrine becomes still more apparent when the doctrinal
view of peace is examined. Peace, to men like Acheson,
Eisenhower, and Dulles, was not simply the absense of war,
but freedom from fear, want, oppression, etc. A "moral
25peace"! v Peace with justice. Peace without justice is
not peace. But there are numerous situations in the
international order in which justice cannot be secured
without some use of force. Tucker put the problem thus:
The American concept of international order
cannot be described as one in which peace is
consciously conceived as a value both discrete
from and higher than justice; nor is security consid-
ered simply in terms of protection against the
overt resort to armed aggression. Nevertheless
the question remains whether a just war doctrine
that so narrowly circumscribes the occasions
in which force may be resorted to will not in
practice lead to conceiving peace and security
in these terms. Justice may be regarded as an
essential concomitant of peace. Yet the critical
question in this context is whether the resort to
force may be judged to have a moral sanction if
there is no effective alternative method for
securing justice. Or is force necessarily to be
regarded as an instrument of injustice when re-
sorted to aggressively, even though such resort
appears at the time as the only effective reaction
against a prior injustice? A literal reading of
the American just war doctrine must answer the
former question negatively and the latter question
affirmatively. It is true that a literal reading
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of the American just war doctrine allows the
conclusion that force may still be regarded as an
instrument of order. But in view of the disparity
arising "between the circumstances in which a
nation's security may be threatened, force can be
regarded as an instrument of order only in a
severely restricted sense. 26-
Ironically, there appears to be no apparent limits
to the different kinds of situations which can be inter-
preted as coming within the scope of the just war doctrine
and it is not always possible to have the stringent
requirements of that doctrine agree with the necessities
of foreign policy. From a theoretical standpoint, it
would be absurd to deny that there will not be major
divergencies between the just war doctrine and the require-
ments of policy implementation, if it is to be successful.
Yet, in practice we function as if this were not the
case, by being vague about the standards governing the
resort to force, and insisting that the interested parties
themselves preserve the right of interpretation of the
professed international standards of conduct. On the other
hand, we have believed that the task of dealing with in-
direct aggression should be assumed by the United Nations
General Assembly.
Thus our championing of the General Assembly
has been a nice mixture of our obsession for moral
certainty and of our desire to employ that body as
a political instrument in support of American
policy. Should the Assembly prove unwilling to lend
itself to the support of American policy in the
future, the occasion could conceivably arise in
which we would consciously choose to place ourselves
in open conflict with what we have heretofore re-




In rounding out this brief overview of pivotal concepts
in the American doctrine of just war several other salient
issues must be identified.
If war cannot be even considered, much less under-
taken, unless in defense against unambiguous armed aggres-
sion, it follows that the methods and purposes employed
in such a war, as well as any preparations for it, must
be purely defensive in character. While this is a high
sounding, altruistic and idealistic assumption, there is
little evidence of it being seriously questioned, except
on rare occasions, in the American public forum.
This assumption, like several others in the just war
doctrine, produces problems both profound and contradictory
in nature
.
The first is that no scientist, politician or philosopher
has ever been able to draw a hard and fast distinction
between weapons that are strictly offensive and those that
are strictly defensive. Even when the most effective
tools of warfare were sword, shield, and spear, the dis-
tinction was never absolute. Soldiers in the Roman army
were trained to use their shields, as well as their swords,
offensively, and to many a barbaric tribe bested in combat
by the disciplined legions of Caesar, the Roman shield was
a fearsome weapon of imperial aggression.
With the advent of modern sophisticated weapons as
a "gift" of Western technology, the distinction is hopelessly
blurred, and the blurring is continuous all the way from
5^

the hand-held weapons of the modern infantryman to the
intercontinental strategic weapons which are supposed to
deter the possible nuclear aggression of the (other)
superpower.
This contradiction produces its most dangerous results
in the field of foreign policy. We sincerely believe that
there is a qualitative distinction between offensive and
defensive weapons, and, furthermore, that our commitment
to it is so self-evident that other nations, especially
our potential enemies, will read that commitment as an
unambiguous signal of our intentions. There is, alas, much
evidence that the Russians do not, in fact, so read our
intentions, and that on more than one occasion they have
interpreted our verbal and non-verbal public communications
as very aggressive indeed.
A second danger is generated by our unquestioned
assumption that others—especially the Russians— see our
words and actions precisely as we do. Thus it is possible
to end up talking only to ourselves about the Russian view
of policy concepts like detente and deterrence. This
remarkable blindness has led us to some amazing long term
defense policy decisions that would be unthinkable were
we to be calmly honest about the available evidence of
Russian military capabilities.
The post facto assessment of our defense preparedness
shows that we have succeeded in propagandizing only our-
selves, consistent with our passionate desire to see the
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international order as a real expression of our own
honorable, philosophical presuppositions. It has been
rightly remarked that, in the fields of foreign policy and
national defense, "we are our own worst enemy."
That our weapons inventory and defense force structure
bear such obvious offensive (aggressive?) capabilities
poses a third danger for us; that a numerically small but
significant body of extreme opinion wants the U.S. to
disarm unilaterally altogether. This classic American
pacifist position is not only by far the simplest ideo-
logically (if one has no weapons, one cannot be preceived
as aggressive, which is for us the highest moral good in
the international order) but also the most consistent with
our inconsistent presuppositions. Thus it is very difficult
for the theoretician and politician, who wants to maintain
a strong national defense posture, to answer many of the
arguments of the pacifist bloc, since both groups (with
only rare exceptions) share the same basic assumptions. The
faction for a strong defense is itself on the ideological
defensive, and finds it much harder to justify its policies,
given the contradictions identified.
There are no "accidents" in human history, if one
accepts the explicit Biblical claim of God's absolute and
sovereign providential control over the affairs of men
and nations, and the fact that the pacifist minority segment
of the opinion-making elite has been able to exert a
disproportionate influence for defense reductions over the
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past twenty years should "be no surprise to one who examines
the ideological antecedents in twentieth century secular
America. The pacifist movement can raise powerful argu-
ments for disarmament (theoretically irrelevant) that are
difficult to refute. Since the Soviets could misperceive
U.S. intentions from the assessment of our force structure
and capabilities, they would have less opportunity to
misinterpret (and thus try a preemptive attack) if there
were, in fact, no U.S. weapons around to be misread. When
the Soviets do misread our intentions, we are inclined
to attribute the ominous error to their pathological fears
arising from a distorted philosophy rather than to any
inconsistencies in our communications.
Another element in the American doctrine is the
equation of defense with prevention or deterrence. This
too is contradictory, for while defense exists to preserve
the status quo, even at the risk of repudiating preventive
war under any circumstances, deterrence has been characterized
by the very same people as effective because it carries the
threat of violence to the aggressor society, to the point
of annihilation by means of overwhelming force. If war
cannot be prevented by all the non-military means available '
to the modern nation-state, then its prevention must be
insured by leaving the potential aggressor in no doubt that
he would lose infinitely more than he could ever hope to
gain, should he resort to aggression.
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The paradox of deterrence theory, however, lies in the
degree of success it enjoys, for as long as it is not
"needed" it is at best defensive (less than defensive in
the classical sense of the term)
, "but should it be employ-
ed, it becomes far more than defensive on the assumption
that the aggressor must be "punished" so as to never try
aggression again.
But how much beyond the requirements of pure defense
must a war go in order to reform an aggressor? And how
likely is the attitude of the aggressor to change for the
better, once hostilities have started? Further, if the
aggressor's power to wage war has not been substantially
diminished, what assurance is there that he will not someday
try again; perhaps with far greater determination? These
are nagging questions which tend to disturb the confidence
of serious thinkers in the validity of the major assump-
tions underlying U.S. deterrence theory. Certainly, in
recent years, the C.P.S.U. has provided abundant evidence
that they believe they could fight an all-out nuclear war—
and win. If this be so, then the very essence of deterrent
philosophy has failed, even though at a secondary level
the Kremlin may not yet be ready to test its own con-
victions that it would survive a strategic nuclear exchange
with the United States.
Hence, for the concept of deterrence to remain effective,
it has had to move imperceptibly but steadily from being
another means of self-defense to a means which could punish
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an aggressor so severely as to deter him from ever trying
again; even to a means of destroying the power of the
aggressor altogether because nothing less can provide the
assurance of preventing another attempt. How ironic that
our philosophy of deterrence should have metamorphosed
from prevention to severe punishment to total destruction,
while at the same time our strategic resources have eroded
drastically vis-a-vis the Soviets; from a capability for
annihilation of their force structure to one, at best, of
a degree of punishment which could be less severe than the
retaliation we would receive from them!
Then there is the great issue of the influence and role
of post World War II military technology upon the just
war doctrine
.
What the moral law permits in order to deter
aggression and to preserve peace, it must equally
permit in order to resist aggression and restore
peace. In either case the purposes sought are the
same--defense and peace—and the only questions
that remain concern the most effective means for
realizing these objectives. The problems of
deterring or resisting aggression are thereby
transformed into "technical" questions governed
by political, military, and, of course, economic
considerations . 28
When the opportunity is afforded to survey the exten-
sive literature of the last twenty-five or so years on
the "strategic debate" it is difficult not to be horrified
at the way in which the great questions of spiritual values,
human lives, the survival of nations, and profound ethical
issues are subordinated, in cavalier fashion, to sophisti-
cated technological discussions of nuclear effects, etc.
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In making this observation, a caveat is in order. The
intent is to neither discount nor discredit the tremendous
scholarly effort that has been invested in attempting to
understand and control the strategic nuclear balance.
Many of the articles and books are thought-provoking, in-
sightful and of excellent quality, contributing substantially
to the nuclear debate. As with the tragedy of spiritual
decay in the institutional church, the dynamic problem is
not so much what the church has done and said as what it
has not done and not said; in the strategic literature the
absence of substantive philosophical and theological think-
ing and, of course, a derivative and systematic ethical
debate about the strategic problems is almost total. The
assumptions held by those involved in this shocking tendency
to concentrate almost exclusively upon statistical and
technological assessments, and later upon computerized
models, have been challenged by a few "mavericks" like
Anatole Rappaport ( Strategy and Conscience ) , but they are
a definite minority. The practical effect of this academic
and political mindset has been to concentrate almost
exclusively on questions of methodology of weapons utiliza-
tion, policy implementation, hypothetical and political
circumstances. The moral issues, if mentioned, are usually
regarded as unchanging and settled, and therefore beyond
dispute. Certainly, they are almost never addressed. When,
on rare occasions, we have exhibited an awareness of the
need for moral justification of American military strategy,
60

nearly always it has been directed to the means and methods
of the warfare in question (the "how") but not the long
term purposes supposedly served by that strategy (the
"why"). Once again it is a case of our intense- preoccupa-
tion with symptoms, while we ignore the more basic causes.
The development of nuclear weapons (strategic and
tactical) has been the technological factor which has
prevented us from returning to the simplistic days of pre-
war isolationism. They have forced the development of a
whole new branch of policy science (strategic studies)
which has radically changed classic concepts of defense and
aggression, forced new interpretive demands upon the Ameri-
can just war doctrine and, because of these weapon's awe-
some destructive potential, called into question as never
before many of our basic assumptions about statecraft,
U.S. foreign policy, and the use and place of military
power. Yet the evidence is that these issues, with a few
notable exceptions, still have not been well thought through
and, further, that nuclear weapons policy lags considerably
behind technological developments in the weapons and their
associated delivery systems.
The first ominous forebodings of a basic change in the
historic Christian concept of limited war for limited
goals came with the notion of "patriotism," which evolved
in the French Revolution. For the first time in history
this led to the deadly notion of "a nation in arms," in
which the entire state, down to the humblest non-combatant
child, was seen as part of the war effort.
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The Civil War produced a concept of victory more
encompassing than that common in Europe in centuries
past, one which foreshadowed the World War II idea of un-
conditional (total) surrender as an inseparable require-
ment of "total victory." And World War II saw an appalling
increase of direct involvement of unarmed and defenseless
citizens in the greater military violence of technological
warfare. The saturation bombing of cities best typifies
this phenomenon. The philosophy that a civilian popula-
tion can make no claim to immunity was, in a very real
sense, "set in concrete" with fearful effectiveness when
President Truman made his decision to drop the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Since then the technological advances in nuclear weaponry
have made those two bombs antiques by comparison, with
new orders of magnitude of destructiveness now available
to the possessors of fusion weapons. Whole populations,
even nation-states, can be "eliminated" more effectively
and extensively than ever. Total war is no longer a phrase
with limited and very relative application. Between the
short term blast, heat and shock capabilities of multi-
megaton weapons, and the long-term radiological effects,
the potential now exists for killing a significant majority
of the world's population.
The most terrible irony of all is that no nation or
leader ever consciously set out to make war total, as a
just and reasonable doctrinal goal. Rather, the rise of
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materialism, the exponential increase in weapons technology,
the intensifying impulses of exaggerated nationalism and
xenophobic pride, and the breakdown of a sound epistemology
based in Biblical theology--replaced with a philosophically
bankrupt humanism- -have combined to make war, and the
theory of war, more and more total. In a sense, nuclear
weapons have become the providential means of highlighting
the utter poverty of our philosophy and ethics of state-
craft and national policy, because the old circumstantial
constraints that severely limited warfare in the past--
economic considerations, transportation and communication
problems, etc., have all been solved with the advent of
nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the most subtle expression of the darkest
side of man's sinful nature has found application in this
grim arena. While we have become more conscious of the
potential horror of nuclear warfare, we appear to be adrift
and almost helpless to resolve the problem, incapable of
dealing effectively with it at its causal levels and,
instead, putting nearly all our corrective efforts in the
basket of technological assessment of various details and
statistical comparisons of tangible weapons resources. In
a sense, we are moving down a philosophically sterile path, a
materialistic treadmill, and seem to be so mesmerized by
the dynamic analytical process in which we are involved
that we cannot dismount.
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An issue of critical importance to this complex
problem must be noted. That is the strong tendency in the
strategic and pacifist literature to view nuclear weapons
as entirely "unique" and, therefore, the moral issues
connected with their use as also being "unique."
This assumption makes any effort to arrive at a
philosophically consistent national security policy
immeasurably more difficult, for while there are strong
intuitive and emotional reasons for so regarding thermo-
nuclear weapons, even a cursory study of their nature and
effects makes such a contention hard to support. If
nuclear weapons effects are to some degree unique in a
functional sense, it is in the vast efficiency of their
capabilities and their long term after effects. To put it
crudely, their uniqueness is in the awesome degree to which
they can provide "more bang for the buck."
The fundamental problem with nuclear weapons, then, is
not really their technological or military uniqueness but
the emotional and circumstantial capacities they "possess"
for subverting our understanding of the more basic doctrinal
issues and problems. These, after all, will be the
ultimate determinants of their "use" even is that "use"
remains a deterrent "non-use."
Put it another way, the real problem is not technology
but an inconsistent and inadequate public policy, devoid
of any theological foundation which in past circumstances
could pass an uncritical muster, but which is now seen to
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be weighed and found wanting. Nuclear weapons have illumi-
nated the flaws, the omissions, the inconsistencies and
the shallowness of the American doctrine of statecraft in
general, and the just war, in particular. If anything
positive at all can be said about nuclear weapons, it is
that their development and deployment have slowly and in-
exorably forced us, in spite of ourselves, to admit
—
reluctantly—that something is very wrong with the public
philosophy.
At its core, the most grievous philosophical sin and
unctional irresponsibility has been to deny the nature of
fallen man. In denying sin, we are forced by our pride
and disobedience to invent a non-existent fantasyland
that consumes untold resources and effort, with terrible
opportunity costs, to justify its existence. This exercise
itself has produced problems in reconciling fact with
fiction that make the fabled emperor of the invisible
clothes look like a hard-nosed exponent of realpolitic by
comparison. In denying sin, we also deny the unpleasant
but necessary concomitants for controlling its (otherwise)
destructive expression, which God Himself has laid down.
These include the admission of the danger of trusting our
own wisdom, the searching of Scripture for the explicit
means to use, and the controlled and disciplined use of
force, always subordinated to a well-thought-cut ethical
system derived directly from the Biblical theology of
responsible statecraft. Of course, such an admission and
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activity is humbling, and to Western man, puffed with the
intellectual pride of a humanism gone berserk , this is a
bitter pill to swallow. It appears we would rather destroy
ourselves with our inventions than bow our heads and hearts
and admit that we are not only wrong but cannot survive as
a nation without the wisdom of God's word and the mercy He
extends to those who humble themselves before Him.
It does not take a great intellect to see that we are
literally destroying ourselves in the name of humanistic
wisdom. We are doing this at almost every level of society,
in taxing the middle class into bankruptcy, taxing business
into closure, forcing investment capital overseas and fixed
incomes into poverty levels, putting administrative
monstrosities and worthless bureaucracies on the sore
backs of taxpayers, and subsidizing criminals while
penalizing law abiding citizens in ways too numerous to
mention. Perhaps most of all, our policy of deterrence
has been so eroded by changes in technology and superpower
force structures that the ultimate disaster of nuclear war
will be brought to pass (oh irony of ironies) most probably
by that sincere but inadequate doctrine which sought to
prevent it at all costs. Tucker has captured the heart of
this relationship between modern weapons technology and our
present moral dilemma:
If it seems too extreme to insist that technology
literally imposes moral dilemmas on men, it does
not appear excessive to conclude that technology
may render irreconcilable moral demands men had
previously been able somehow to reconcile.
Technology cannot make men bad, but it may surely
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give rise to circumstances in which it is in-
creasingly difficult to be good. The restraint and
moderation men practice are not unrelated to the
anxieties they experience, anxieties they have not
conjured up from tortured imaginations but which
result from an awareness of the harm others may in
fact inflict on them. In this sense at least, tech-
nology invariably limits the alternatives men will
consider and restricts the choices they will make.
Of course, a simple, almost primitive, view
will insist that the fortunate consequence of
technological innovation is that it encourages only
"aggressors" to pursue their evil designs. Ex-
perience might have taught us, however, that tech-
nology may tempt not only aggressors but the victims
of aggression as well. The latter are not somehow
provided with a natural immunity from the tempta-
tions posed by technology. They are not exempt from
the temptation to assume that technological advance
must always work to their advantages, presumably
because they are the more virtuous. Nor have they
been free from the temptation to entertain radical
solutions to the security problem or from justifying
these solutions by the claim that their purposes in
employing technology are purely defensive in
character. By a "logic" that is as recurring as the
history of conflict, the potential victims of
aggression may thus become in turn the potential
aggressors .29
And further, he faces squarely the egocentric causes
of our dilemma:
These considerations suggest that the strategy
of nuclear deterrence has its deepest roots in what
might well be termed an act of faith. As such, that
strategy must in the final analysis prove independent
of prudential calculation and rational considerations.
The "higher rationality" of deterrence might therefore
be formulated in the following manner: It is not
prudence but faith in ourselves and in our purposes
that is ultimately needed to achieve the goal of
banishing aggressive force from history. To persuade
the would-be aggressor we need only first persuade
ourselves. To convince the adversary that we would
act in the manner threatened, it is indispensable
to convince ourselves that we would so respond. As
long as we believe, others will believe. And as long
as others believe, they will not act. The key to a
successful strategy of nuclear deterrence lies
wholly within ourselves. 30
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It would be hard to imagine a more absolute fulfillment
of the Biblical warning about self understanding, which
applies as well to nations as to individuals: "There is a
way which seems right to a man, but the end thereof are
the ways of death. "^ 1
In concluding this brief assessment, the fruits of a
research effort undertaken within another department
(Management) at the Naval Postgraduate School are mentioned
as having some bearing on this subject. The above discussion
posited the thesis that we Americans do not want to face
for the most part, the ethical and philosophical problems
inherent in the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons. The research project set out to test this hypothesis,
with the additional assumption that U.S. armed forces
officers who had served in nuclear weapons billets before
coming to the Postgraduate School as students should be a
group of people who have thought seriously - if anybody
has - about these policy problems. The results of the
survey appear to indicate otherwise; that the cultural
conditioning and on-the-job social environment can be
strong enough to override the powerful inducements to
discussion and reflection about the significance of nuclear
weapons that would seem to come from a hands-on, professional






6. Czarist Russia is a classic example of this phenomenon.
In spite of being a totalitarian and repressive state,
the Russian involvement in World War I contributed
significantly to the success of the Bolshevist takeover.
7. The moral reality of war is divided into two parts.
War is always judged twice, first with reference to
the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with
reference to the means they adopt. The first kind
of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that
a particular war is just or unjust. The second is
adverbial: we say that the war is being fought
justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the differ-
ence a matter of prepositions, distinguishing jus ad
bellum
,
the justice of war, from jus in bello
,
justice
in war. These grammatical distinctions point to deep
issues. Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments
about aggression and self-defense; jus in bello about
the observance or violation of the customary and
positive rules of engagement. The two sorts of judg-
ment are logically independent. It is perfectly
possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and
for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance
with the rules. But this independence, though our
views of particular wars often conform to its terms,
is nevertheless puzzling. It is a crime to commit
aggression, but aggressive war is a rule-governed
activity. It is right to resist aggression, but the
resistance is subject to moral (and legal) restraint.
The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at
the heart of all that is most problematic in the
moral reality of war.
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, Inc.,
New York, 1977, p. 21.
8. The strategist is not unaware of confusion and dis-
order in the field; nor is he entirely unwilling to
see these as aspects of war itself, the natural
effects of the stress of battle. But he sees them
also as matters of command responsibility, failures
of discipline or control. He suggests that strategic
imperatives have been ignored; he looks for lessons
to be learned.
The moral theorist is in the same position. He too
must come to grips with the fact that his rules are
often violated or ignored--and with the deeper
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realization that, to men at war, the rules often
don't seem relevant to the extremity of their
situation. But however he does this, he does not
surrender his sense of war as a human action,
purposive and premeditated, for whose effects someone
is responsible. Confronted with the many crimes
committed in the course of a war, or with the crime
of aggressive war itself, he searches for human agents.
Nor is he alone in this search. It is one of the
most important features of war, distinguishing it
from the other scourges of mankind, that the men and
women caught up in it are not only victims, they are
also participants. All of us are inclined to hold
them responsible for what they do (though we may
recognize the plea of duress in particular cases)
.
Reiterated over time, our arguments and judgments
shape what I want to call the moral reality of war--
that is, all those experiences of which moral
language is descriptive or within which it is
necessarily employed.
Walzer, pp. 14-15.
9. To justify any action full of moral overtones is
reasonable even if the substance of the justifications
may be unreasonably wrong and even immoral by our lights.
10. Robert W. Tucker, The Just War, The Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, i960, p. 1-12.
11
.
Trial of Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal
, IWT, II, W-
12. November 1, 1956 Department of State Bullentin ,
XXXV, 752.
13. Tucker, pp. 15-16.
14. Hearings before the Joint Senate Committee on Armed
Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military
Situation in the Far East (82nd Congress, 1st Session)
Part III, p. 1720.
15. News Conference, July 2, 1957 ( State Department Bulletin ,
XXXVII, p. 143)
.
16. Tucker, pp. 21-22.
17. George Kennan, A Current Assessment of Soviet -
American Relations Remarks of a meeting of the




18. The most pernicious contribution of the social
sciences (invented in this country) has been the
victim theory to explain criminal behavior in
individuals. It has been a philosophical cornerstone
of the secular priesthood (psychology and psychiatry)
which, in the twentieth century, has supplanted the
ministers, priests and rabbis as the God-ordained
healers of problems both spiritual and emotional
in nature. Its effects have been so extensive as to
be unmeasurable , not the least of which has been to
radically alter the entire philosophy and functions
of our legal system, school system, policy system,
military structure and the government bureaucratic
picture at every level. This subject is so vast that
extensive scholarly research would be needed to
explore adequately its causes and effects.
19. For the Biblical exposition of this subject, see the
Chapter on the Biblical view of war.
20. Remarks made at Palm Beach roundtable on "War or Peace,"
March 2, 1953, Department of State Bulletin , XXVIII,
p. 412.
21. Television interview, September 10, 1950 » Department
of State Bulletin , XXIII, p. 406.
22. Harry S. Truman, address at Dedication of the Chapel
of the Four Chaplains, Philadelphia, 3 February 1951,
Department of State Bulletin , XXIV, p. 283.
23' The picture of a world divided into the evil few and
the innocent many may become blurred by the passions
engendered during a period of war, but it has never
been erased. Even a policy of unconditional surrender
must somehow be adjusted to it. During World War II
President Roosevelt took care to emphasize on more
than one occasion that: "In our uncompromising policy
(i.e., unconditional surrender) we mean no harm to
the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean
to impose punishment and retribution in full upon
their guilty, barbaric leaders." (Bulletin, VIII,
146) And in the war crimes trials that followed the
war, American tribunals consistently professed this
distinction. Thus, in one of the post-Nuremberg
proceedings dealing with those accused of crimes
against peace the court declared: "The defendants
now before us were neither high public officials in
the civil government nor high military officers.
Their participation was that of followers and not
leaders. If we lower the standard of participation to
include them, it is difficult to find a logical place
to draw the line between the guilty and the innocent
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among the great mass of the German people. It
is, of course, unthinkable that the majority of
Germans should be condemned as guilty of committing
crimes against peace. This would amount to a
determination of collective guilt to which the
corollary of mass punishment is the logical result,
for which there is no precedent in international
law and no justification in human relations." The
I.G. Farben Trial, Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals
,
X (19^9), 39. Given this distinction,
the measures taken in war which affect the "common
people" of the aggressor state cannot be accorded a
punitive interpretation--they are not "acts of
punishment" but acts which, however, unfortunate in
their "incidental" effects, are made "militarily
necessary" in order to defeat and to punish the true
aggressor. Observers have been inclined, for the
most part, to attribute this picture of a world
divided between the evil few and the many good to our
belief in the inherent goodness of man and the
inevitability of human progress. Perhaps of equal
significance, however, is a much simpler though
somewhat less complimentary explanation, i.e., the
exception to date of the American continent from the
ravages of modern war. Whether the attitude we have
heretofore manifested in war could survive in hostilities
carried directly to American territory remains to be
seen. Elmer Davis once ventured the opinion that
"if a few Russion atom bombs were dropped on American
cities, I doubt if our statesmen would find it advisable
to say anything more about how we love the Russian
people." "Vox Populi and Foreign Policy," Harper'
s
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June, 1952, p. 72.
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2Ur. Tucker, pp. 44-45.
25. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 20th September 1950
address before the U.N. General Assembly, Department
of State Bulletin , XXIII, p. 529-
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IV. TOWARD A BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF
STATECRAFT AND THE JUST WAR
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT THEOLOGICAL
PROBLEM
The chief difficulty in formulating a Biblical exegetical
theology of contemporary government, respecting the conduct
of foreign affairs in general, and warfare in particular,
is in penetrating the awesome accumulation of half-truths
and unrecognized "inaccuracies" that surround the nebulous
idea of "Christianity" in our secularized culture. A
major contributor to this contretemps is the institutional
church and its colleges and seminaries.
The speculative theology movement originated in the
1800' s in the School of Theology at the University of
32Tubingen, Germany. A progressive denigration of con-
fidence in the inspiration, authenticity and accuracy of
the original Bible texts was accomplished under the guise
of "higher textual criticism." The effect was to make the
Word of God less relevant to those who believed in this
sophisticated system of skepticism, both in terms of
personal belief and societal norms. Seminary professors
and pastors who were trained in the higher textual criticism
(or negative criticism) school, preached the new "social
gospel," noteworthy for its emphasis on neighborly "do-
goodism" and its consistent intellectualism. The Bible,
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if used at all, served merely as a springboard for
speculation that, more often than not, demonstrably
contradicted long-accepted Biblical doctrines. This social
gospel became the ultimate intellectual basis for the
"anything goes" gospel of the 1960*s.
The erosion of public confidence in the validity of
the Bible as a societal norm was accelerated by the
repetitious preaching of a constellation of false platitudes
which became so embedded in the American culture that they
presently form the essence of a secular religion of
33
"conventional wisdom. nJJ
Biblical theology is only derivative and exegetical,
not speculative. Speculative theology is therefore a
contradiction in terms. While it is not the purpose of
this study to refute speculative theology as such, it
has been the source of a vast misunderstanding in America
about what the Bible has to say on almost any subject, and
on civil government in particular. It is no exaggeration,
nor is it unkind, to insist that most Americans are
Biblically illiterate, innoculated with just enough
sanctified nonsense about the Bible to prejudice most
attempts at careful exposition. Slogans require far less
intellectual effort to understand than logical analysis
based upon carefully examined presuppositions, and this
mentality has been very successful in obscuring the
truth in the area of the Biblical ethics of statecraft.
Misunderstanding has focused around "killing," where the
7^

commandment "thou shalt not kill" is read as prohibiting
all killing under all circumstances, including even that
undertaken within the context of military or police service.
The thesis of this research is that there exists a
Biblical theology of statecraft (foreign relations) and
tangible support for the ethical and moral concept of the
just war. This study will set forth systematically, though
not exhaustively, the Biblical teaching on Civil government
and the conduct of war, highlighting the commonest areas
of misunderstanding on these subjects.
B. FO REWARD
There are five presuppositions underlying the research
mode of this subject that must be mentioned, however
briefly:
First, though a demonstration of the reasonableness of
this supposition on the basis of internal and external
textual evidence would fill a large volume, the confidence
of this writer in the testable historical, scientific, and
theological trustworthiness of the Biblical texts is based
not on "blind faith" but upon an extensive examination of
all the categories of attesting evidence, covering more
than fifteen years.
Second, the author holds that the internal and external
evidence richly support the internal claims of Scripture
about its Divine authorship with a consistency unmatched
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by any other document, ancient or modern. Virtually all
of the known ancient writings, whether sacred or secular,
are supported by one or two early manuscripts, often copied
centuries or millenia after the author wrote. The Bible,
on the other hand, consisting of the sixty-six books of
the Old and New Testaments, is uniquely supported textually
to an extent unequalled by any other book: namely, in
excess of 1^00 ancient manuscripts, some having been
written within a few years of the originals. Whether an
individual ultimately accepts or rejects the claims of
Scripture concerning its origins, intellectual honesty
demands recognition of the absolute nature of these internal
claims to Divine authorship.
All Scripture is God-breathed3^ and profitable
for teaching, for reproof, for correcting, for
training in righteousness, that the man of God may
be adequate, equipped for every good work. 35
For no prophecy was ever made by an act of
human will, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke
from God. 3°
These claims are so stated that they cannot be half-
true. They stand or fall together. Either they are ture
without qualification or they are not. The nature of
the claims precludes the third option of truth being
intermingled with error.
The third presupposition underlying this study is
chat there is an intended, clear, discernible meaning
37for the vast majority of Biblical texts. So much is
made today of those (usually narrow) areas of differing
interpretation that little recognition is accorded to the
?6

vast area of agreement among serious Bible scholars who
accept the existence of a disciplined, biblically originated
science of hermeneutics . Serious students of Scripture,
even if unable to read either classical Hebrew or Koine
Greek, can nevertheless attain a sufficient understanding
of Biblical principles with the investment of reasonable
exegetical effort. The area we are concerned with here is
expecially noteworthy for its simplicity and clarity, being
far less open to interpretation than most other controversial
Biblical subjects.
The fourth presupposition is that there are several
English language editions of the Old and New Testaments
available which are excellent translations of the best
Hebrew and Greek texts, and many of those original language
texts, in turn, are accurate renditions of the original
autographs. There have been so many recent discoveries
of ancient manuscripts and tablets attesting extant manu-
scripts that there is little disagreement among scholars
on the content of the original writings.
The Dead Sea Scrolls are a case in point. One of the
manuscripts from that discovery is an entire text of the
book of Isaiah, nearly 1,000 years older than the earliest
known manuscripts of the Prophet.
Textual scholars estimate that there are approximately
forty words in the entire Old Testament about which there
are real disagreements, or doubts as to their authenticity,
and none of these affect or impair a single substantive
11

39doctrine or historical fact.^' Hence a high order of
confidence in the trustworthiness of the best available
original language manuscripts, and those translations which
faithfully reproduce these in English, is entirely
reasonable and not inconsistent with the standards of
modern scientific, empirical scholarship.
The translation principally quoted in this thesis is
the New American Standard Version. The New American
Standard Version (NASV) , along with the New International
Version (NTV) , is quite distinct from the many paraphrases
on the market today which make no pretense of accuracy
with the original Hebrew and Greek texts.
The fifth presupposition is that the proper business
of Biblical scholarship— as defined by the Bible --is not
the formulation of opinions (however exalted or excellent
they may seem or claim to be) or the advancement of
suppositions. The only legitimate activity afforded
students of Scripture, on the basis of its own mandate, is
to carefully exposit that which is always there, as
42
systematically and completely as possible. Any study of
Scripture, to honor the Creator, must diligently seek to
set forth the principles it contains, as free from bias
as possible. While perfection in achieving this goal
must elude any exegete, by virtue of human frailty, this
study will attempt to substantiate every principle addressed
with textual and contextual evidence.
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A brief word is in order concerning the three didactic
levels found throughout Scripture. The word of God
conveys its truth in three modalities namely by precept,
normative and non-normative example, and "good and necessary"
inference. Obviously, clear precept is the easiest to
understand and deal with. The Scripture, being consumately
honest concerning the sinful nature of mankind, reports
some examples of disobedient behavior that were never
intended to be normative. Example, then, requires a higher
level of contextual support to establish any claim to
normative authority. Good and necessary inference is the
third and most difficult level of exposition. It requires
a degree of logical competence in those who undertake it,
inasmuch as the underlying presuppositions must be identified,
and the methodology by which conclusions are drawn from
those presuppositions recognized and understood. Anything
less dilutes the legitimacy of such conclusions.
C. ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT
The Bible presents a rich body of information on the
subject of government from the first book of the
Pentateuch -' through the Revelation of St. John, much of
it in declarative, propositional form. Virtually every
aspect of government that is discussed in the Old Testament
is substantiated, and sometimes enlarged upon, in the New.
The principal basis of civic rectitude and the
enforcement of God-ordained norms of societal behavior
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derives from theological truths which transcend individual
feelings, governments, circumstances or philosophies.
These include the revelational proposition that man is
made in the image of God and, being owned by God, is
expected to conform his behavior to Divinely established
standards, for which conformity, or lack thereof, he will
be held accountable.
Man, acting in concert, is awarded a degree of real
authority patterned after the Lordship of the Creator
Himself. The highest duty of government is to uphold the
integrity and safety of individuals, precisely because
they are the image bearers of God's own character and
personality. This conferred authority is reflected in
the cultural mandate given to Adam in the garden of Eden,
in which he was commanded to
:
. . . rule over the fish of the sea and over
the birds of the sky, and over the cattle and over
all the earth, and over every creeping thing that
creeps on the earth.
And God created man in His own image, in the
image of God He created him; male and female He
created them. And God blessed them; and God said
to them, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the
earth, and subdue it; and rule over the fish of
the sea and over the birds of the sky, and oyer
every living thing that moves on the earth '."^
After the fall, when sin entered into the human race,
the mandate was never withdrawn, but rather attended with
new difficulties, which would rob man of much of the joy
and satisfaction in his work originally intended for him
by God. As far as the cosmos was concerned, thorns and
thistles would now infest the ground, making the production
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of food and the struggle for survival an ongoing battle
with adverse elements including weeds and pests. Humanity
would no longer be benign, but continually troubled by
the sinful behavior of all its members, requiring certain
kinds of collective control for the good of society. In
this context of anthropological tragedy, the lord considered
it imperative for us to remember His abstract revelations
concerning the origin and purpose of man, as God's image
bearer, requires of him the consistent enforcement of
specific sanctions against lawbreakers.
The failure of a given government to recognize its
obligation to the Godhead as its first raison d'etre is to
guarantee that its members will eventually slide into
relativism, where all views are considered as personal
opinions, equally valid (or invalid) and eventually the
very legitimacy and existence of that government will thus
be called into question.
In the period immediately following the flood, God
laid down this specific requirement:
And surely I will require your lifeblood; from
every beast I will require it. And from every man,
from every man's brother I will require the life of
man. Whoever sheds man's blood, by man(kind) his
blood shall be shed, for in the image of God He made
man. ^-5
It was intended for mankind (acting in concert)
,
rather than man as an individual. Captial punishment was
to be applied to a proven murderer, not to those who




To underscore the fact of an early distinction made
between individual and civil responsibilities laid down in
Scripture, it is instructive to note that this first
statement of the commandment requiring capital punishment
for proven murderers antedates, by many centuries, the
Mosaic law, which also forbade murder, and specified a
wider range of application for capital punishment.
The simplistic notion prevalent today that the Bible
(and, by inference, Christianity) forbids any and all
killing not only fails to deal with this Divine commandment
spoken to Noah, but feeds on the translational error
perpetrated for over ^00 years in most English language
editions of the Bible. It is simply incorrect to render
Exodus 20:13 and Deuteronomy 5:17, "Thou shalt not kill."
hiThey properly read, "Thou shalt not murder." '
At this point some some may object that it is not
legitimate to draw inferences for contemporary government
from the Old Testament, since the Sinaitic lawcode ex-
plicitly established a theocratic government, which would
be impossible and improper to undertake today. However,
Scripture does not leave us in an impasse concerning this
valid question, for although Jesus Christ clearly distin-
guished between the secular authorities and the visible,
institutional church, both in His day and for the balance
of history, He never even questioned the legitimacy of civil
government. He did this in three ways. First, by refusing
to allow the Jewish people to make Him into their secular
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king. Second, by emphatically declaring that, "My king-
dom is not of this world. Third, by ordering his
disciples, and the Pharisees, to pay taxes to the secular
Roman government, in addition to carrying out their
spiritual obligations to God. ' Furthermore, He was
jealous to underscore the validity of the Old Testament
Biblical principles given to rulers and judges for the
proper conduct of government, the judiciary, and the
enforcement of the civil laws.
The Apostle Paul, writing to the small congregation
in Rome, the Imperial seat of the Empire, commanded that
every person is to be in subjection to the
governing authorities. For there is no authority
except from God, and those which exist are
established by God. Therefore he who resists
authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and
they who have opposed will receive condemnation
upon themselves. . . . For because of this you also
pay taxes, for rulers are servants of God, devoting
themselves to this very thing. Render to all what
is due them, tax to whom tax is due; custom to
whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom
honor. 51
Here Paul has only expanded the inferences in Christ's
instruction to "render unto Caesar the things that are
52Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. And
just as the duties of the citizen to the state are clearly
spelled out in Scripture so are the duties of rulers.
Secular authorities, or kings, are to rule according
to the commandments of Scripture, both with respect to
their own personal conduct, and the government of the
state, and to continually remember that they are
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appointed to their office by God. Hence they are account-
able to the Lord for their personal behavior and their
stewardship of office.
. . You shall surely set a king over you whom the
Lord your God chooses. . .neither shall he multiply
wives for himself, lest his heart turn away; nor
shall he greatly increase silver and gold for
himself. Now it shall come about when he sits on
the throne of his kingdom, he shall write for him-
self a copy of this law on a scroll in the
presence of the Levitical priests. And it shall
be with him, and he shall read it all the days of
his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his
God, by carefully observing all the words of this
law and these statutes, that his heart may not be
lifted up above his countrymen and that he may not
turn aside from the commandment, to the right or the
left; in order that he and his sons may continue
long in his kingdom in the midst of Israel. -53
The rulers are to remember that they are God's vice-
gerents, and it behooves them to watch "with all care,
earnestness and- diligence , that in their administration
they may exhibit to men an image, as it were, of the
providence, care, goodness, benevolence and justice of
God. »&
When both Moses and Jehoshaphat wished to exhort the
judges of the Israelites to discharge their duty in an
upright manner, they did so by calling upon the principle
mentioned above. Moses said, "Judge righteously between
every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with
him. For the judgment is God' s . "^ And Jehoshaphat
admonished them, "Take heed what you do, for you judge
not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the
judgment. Wherefore now let the fear of the Lord be upon
you: take heed and do it; for there is no iniquity with
the Lord our God." 56
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In the application of just punishments for clearly
proven crimes, magistrates act not for themselves, but
rather execute the judgments of God, unembarrassed by the
commandment, "Thou shalt not murder^, because its prohibi-
tion does not apply to them in their official capacity.
Thus, we ought to recognize that homicide should never go
unpunished, and for this reason the Scripture has put
the power of the sword into the hands of the magistrate.
To hurt and to destroy unilaterally are incompatible with
the character of the godly, but for the state to avenge
the afflictions of the righteous at the command of God is
neither to hurt nor to destroy.
Perhaps the most ironic and tragic aspect of a humanism
which unbiblically presupposes the innate or basic human
goodness of man is that the claimed high regard for the
dignity of man has led eventually to the monstrosity of
murdering millions of unborn children in the name of
individual "rights," an urban populace terrified by violent
criminals often released or unpunished by the courts,
Christian schools savagely attacked by the Internal Revenue
Service for being racially biased, and euthanasia being
proposed as a desirable solution for the aged by those
whose duty it is to heal and protect life, and those
supposed to uphold social moral standards.
The failure to recognize the distinction between
biblical prohibitions binding upon private individuals and
the enforcement of required punishments carried out by
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servants of the civil government has led to these and many
other social tragedies in the United States. The unwilling-
ness to avenge the afflictions of the righteous by the
ungodly is to sin against the revealed wisdom and will of
a Holy Creator, and thereby opens mankind needlessly to
all manner of harmful excesses, violence and crime.
A final point needs to be stressed in connection with
the foregoing. The power of the state to suppress evil
and uphold civil rectitude ultimately depends upon its
ability and willingness to enforce its own laws—by the
sword if necessary. Justice becomes impossible without the
power or will for enforcement, and the courts of such a
nation become a mockery of justice so serious that God
has committed Himself to severely punishing those leaders
who fall into this evil. Hence the unqualified prohibition
of all killing, including that of capital punishment, could
become a major cause of more killing and destruction,
within and without, for the state which holds such poisonous
ideology in its collective consciousness.
D. ON WAR
In attempting to set forth the Biblical position on
the causes and conduct of war by legitimate governments,
it is necessary to restate unequivocally that this is
intended to be exegetical, and in most points will be
diametrically opposed to conventional suppositions about
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the "Christian" view of war. Much of what passes today
as Christian thinking is not that at all, if we properly
mean by "Christian" that which derives its nature (or
essence) and application solely from the Scriptures.
Christ's stinging indictment of the intellectual elite of
His day could be applied as well to the opinion makers
and speculative theologians of our day:
You have made the word of God of no effect by
your tradition. You hypocrites, rightly did Isaiah
prophesy of you, saying, "This people honors me
with their lips, but their heart is far from me.
But in vain do they worship me, teaching as their
doctrines the precepts of men! "-57
The theologians of the Reformation recognized that the
ultimate epistemological principle expressed in the word of
if Q
God is the fact that God IS. From this beginning all
else flows, including the reason for man's existence, and
the nature of the revelations given to men about the Lord
Himself, and His dealings with men. For example, Calvin's
Institutes of the Christian Religion begin by addressing
the subject of the knowledge of God, and everything else
discussed takes its departure from what is established
under that head. Thus, when a particular subject is
expounded from Scripture, most of the theologians with a
Reformation commitment will first check to see if there
are any implications for that issue in the being of God
Himself. The subject of War is no exception to this




A further axiom must be identified at this juncture.
It is here assumed that when the conduct of war by govern-
ment (s) is addressed, that the government under study is
legitimate according to Biblical criteria. There is but
one apparent "exception" to the Biblical precept that
rebellion against a government ordained by God constitutes
one of the most serious of all iniquities. That exception
is that all the criteria for loss of legitimacy must be
met before resistance is justified. A ruler (or rulers)
then, has the right to conduct war according to the
constraints of God's word, and internal rebellion constitutes
an act of war. Hence, while not mentioned in the section
on government it will be included in the subject of the
conduct of war.
In an age that has exalted indiscriminate sentimentality
to the level of sacred dogma, it may come as a distinct
surprise to many that the Lord declares Himself to be a
"Man of War,"^ 9 or as the NASV translates this text, "The
LORD (JHWH in the original Hebrew) is a warrior; the LORD
is his name." Nor is such a view confined to the Old
Testament. Almost the final view of Christ given in
Scripture is that of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of
heaven:
And I saw heaven opened; and behold, a white
horse, and He who sat upon it is called Faithful
and True; and in righteousness He judges and wages
war. And His eyes are a flame of fire, and upon His
head are many diadems;. . .and He is clothed with a
robe dipped in blood; and His name is called the
Word of God. And the armies which are in heaven,
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clothed in fine linen, white and clean, were follow-
ing Him on white horses. And from His mouth comes
a sharp sword, so that with it He may smite the
nations; and He will rule them with a rod of iron;
and He treads the wine press of the fierce wrath of
God, the Almighty. And on His robe and on His
thigh He has a name written, "King of Kings, and
Lord of Lords. "°0
Furthermore, this is entirely consistent with Christ's
view of Himself during his earthly ministry, where in He
declared, "Do not think that I came to bring peace on the
earth; I did not come to bring peace, but a sword."
The objection may be raised that this is inconsistent
with the angelic proclamation of "Peace on earth, good
will to men," at the time of Christ's incarnation. This
single mistranslation has caused much harm among mankind,
including the widespread false assurance of God's favor.
It is also an example of the incalculable consequences of
failing to accurately translate the Scriptures from the
original languages, which can foster an entirely false
theology held in all sincerity by multitudes. No less
a prestigious and highly regarded translation than the King
James Version is the original perpetrator of this error.
Properly translated, the angelic proclamation conveys a
concept quite at odds with the assumption of a blandly
tolerant God of love for whom the righteous judgment of
the unrepentant is unthinkable. The declared promise is
clearly and specifically affirmed: "Glory to God in the
highest, and on earth peace among men with whom He is well-
pleased . " (my italics) Those with whom God is well-pleased
are the redeemed, and no others; and despite differences
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over the interpretation of who constitutes that favored
company, there is a clear textual implication that there
must be some with whom He is not well-pleased, for other-
wise the declaration would make no sense.
Because conventional wisdom postulates a God whose
only characteristic is indiscriminate love, there is a
strong tradition among institutional churches to ignore,
or attempt to explain away, those New Testament passages
which counter the comfortable "love" assumption. John 3:16,
the most widely quoted text of the Bible, illustrates the
point. It is seldom read in context, for it is then-
impossible to maintain a position of universal benignancy
with respect to the coming of the Messiah.
For God so loved the world,' that He gave His
only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him
should not perish but have eternal life. For God
did not send the Son into the World to judge the
world; but that the world would be saved through
Him. He who believes in Him is not judged; he who
does not believe has been judged already, because he has
not believed in the name of the only begotten Son
of God. 63 (my italics)
New Testament theology is explicit on the subject of
warfare between God and man ". . .because the carnal mind
is at enmity with God." And, ". . .do you not know that
Friendship with the world is hostility (lit. enmity) toward
God?" 65
In describing unbelievers in their natural state, Paul
does not hesitate to call them enemies (of God). "Much
more then, having now been justified by His blood, we shall
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be saved from the wrath of God through Him. For if while
we were enemies
, we were reconciled to God. . .
"
We find, then, that the New Testament, far from
repudiating or diluting the Old Testament concepts con-
cerning warfare, actually builds on them, and includes the
doctrine that God pictures Himself at War with the ungodly,
and Himself in the role as the Warrior of all time.
Indeed, if we take the Scriptural view of man, we are
forced to admit that warfare is so much a part of human
existence that it cannot be ignored or wished away. It will
either be faced maturely and wisely, or foolishly, by a
nation. The leaders who fail to contend realistically
with its causes, nature, and control are actually foredoomed
to a greater vulnerability to war in the end!
It is very difficult for Western man, innoculated with
anthropocentric scientism, to admit to the sinful nature
inherent in all humans, which is claimed in Scripture.
The perfectibility of man is so fundamental an assumption
of humanism that sociologists and philosophers have developed
a whole constellation of theories about war which seek
the causes of warfare everywhere but in man's nature.
That these attempts have failed can be strongly argued
from the observation that efforts are still being made to
find a "satisfactory" explanation for the causes of warfare.
Obviously, if the existing explanations were "satisfactory,"
the search for new ones would become pointless.
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The Bible periodically declares that war cannot, and
will not, "be eliminated on earth until God Himself terminates
human history. The most vivid instance of this position
is found in the gospel of Matthew, where Christ is reported
to have enumerated the signs heralding His second coming,
and also pointed out that, "You will be hearing of wars
and rumors of war. . .for nation will rise against nation,
67
and kingdom against kingdom. . ." ' Mark and Luke also
recorded this promise in their gospels (13*7-8 and 21:9-10
respectively)
. This view is neither pleasant nor popular,
and resistance to it is not new.
In the days of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel one of
the most notable marks of the false prophets who had
multiplied in the land was their constant proclamation of
68
"peace, peace" when there was, in fact, no peace coming,
but certain war.
And they have healed the wound of my people
slightly, saying, "Peace, peace," but there was no
peace. . .For from the least of them even to the
greatest of them, every one is greedy for gain. And
from the prophet even to the priest, every one deals
falsely. °9
Certainly this message of appeasement and threat
denial by the leaders of that day has a curiously modern
ring. The gravity of their false ministry and message of
hope was then addressed:
Were they ashamed because of the abomination
which they had done (propagating the false message
of peace)? They were not even ashamed at all; they
did not even know how to blush. Therefore they shall
fall among those who fall; at the time that I punish
them, they shall be cast down, says the lord.7<
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Israel's willingness to listen to these illegitimate
and self-appointed spokesmen for God led to certain
disaster at the hands of her enemies for the acceptance
of false reassurance led to inadequate preparation for
war, spiritually and militarily.
In summary, the only genuinely bright spot in this
somber picture is the reasonable hope that leaders can
minimize, manage, and even avoid warfare on occasion--if
they are willing to admit its true causes, to face it for
what is it, and to control armed conflict according to the
wise guidance of Scripture.
There is a fundamental presupposition of Christology
which must be posited before additional thoughts of the
Lord Jesus Christ on the subject of war and the military
are examined. That is that Christ, as the claimed Son
of God, the Word made flesh, was without sin.
Since then we have a great high priest who has
passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God,
let us hold fast our confession. For we do not
have a high priest who cannot sympathize with our
weakensses, but one who has been tempted in all
things as we are, yet without sin . 71 (my italics)
The implications of this are enormous, for Christ
72
continually rebuked sinful behavior' by those with whom
He came in contact, which was consistent with his righteous
nature. When He dealt with the Samaritan woman at the
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well,'-' He did not hesitate to confront her with her sins
of sexual impurity. He confronted Zaccheus, the tax
' t
75
collector at Jericho, with his sin of embezzlement,' he
Scribes and Pharisees with their theological hypocrisy,
76
and His own disciples with their sins.'
93

A pastoral principle of our Lord thus may be extracted
from the Gospels. When He dealt with people, if they had
sins of role, occupation, behavior, or relationship, He
did not hesitate to rebuke the particular inquity, doing
so as part of His messianic ministry.
If we remember this principle, then there is a
startling inference in Jesus' s remarks about war and the
military. He never rebuked anyone enlisted in the military
for serving in what many assume is a basically iniquitous
occupation. On the contrary, Christ actually used the
institution of the military, and the proper conduct of
warfare, to illustrate transcendent spiritual principles
77
of His kingdom which is "not of the world.' '
To begin with, Christ did, in fact, allow that the
conduct of war can be the proper business of rulers:
Whoever does not carry his own cross and come
after Me cannot be my disciple. . .Or what king when
he sets out to meet another king in battle, will not
first sit down and take counsel whether he is strong
enough with ten thousand men to encounter the one
coming against him with twenty thousand? Or else,
while the other is still far away, he sends a
delegation and asks terms of peace. 78
A king may elect to sue for peace terms if he cannot muster
the resources to prosecute the war with a reasonable
probability of success, and this particular example of
intelligent choice in the realm of statecraft is employed
by Christ as a call to Christian commitment, with our
eyes open about the "cost" of discipleship . This in no
way puts a perforative cast upon the prerogative of the
9^

king to undertake war. Rather, the didactic power of
the simile is that, if he goes to war, he had better do
it wisely with respect to his manpower reserves.
This perception is consistent with Old Testament
commandments concerning contemplated war. "Prepare plans
79by consultation, and make war by wise guidance.' And
"By guidance you will wage war, and in abundance of
counsellors there is victory." War, if it is to be
waged at all, requires careful planning and wise counsel.
The Scripture is also more honest about unpleasant truths
than most politicians, for it candidly admits that there is
indeed, ". . .a time of war. . . " just as there is " . . .
a time of peace. . ."
Christ never suggested that men should seek discharge
from a military establishment, nor did Biblical leaders
deride warriors. When our Lord dealt with the Centurion
(an officer in the Roman Army occupying Palestine) who
had requested Christ's intercession for his seriously ill
servant, Christ strongly commended him as possessing
Q p
greater faith than anyone in Israel. Yet our Lord said
not a word about resignation of this man's commission in
the army. It is inconceivable that the sinless Messiah
would fail to urge resignation from the hierarchy of the
hated occupation army, were that action essential to
validate repentance, faith and godliness. Christ never
hesitated to demand of His followers when appropriate , a
high order of commitment which could involve the loss of
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possessions, family and sometimes, even life itself. To
appreciate the full force of our Lord's tacit legitimi-
zation of the military occupation in this instance, it
may "be recalled that He commended few people in the three
years of His public ministry, and almost never in such
powerful terms.
In the same vein, when Israel went out to hear John
the Baptist preach by the river Jordan, and there received
instruction concerning their behavior that would authenti-
cate their professed repentance, John's words to the Roman
soldiers are significant:
He therefore began saying to the multitudes
who were going out to be baptized by him, "You
brood of vipers, who warned you to flee from the
wrath to come? Therefore bring forth fruits in
keeping with your repentance". . .And the multitudes
were questioning him, saying, "Then what shall we
do?". . .And some soldiers were questioning him,
saying, "And what about us, what shall we do?"
And he said to them, "Do not take money from
anyone by force, or accuse anyone falsely, and be
content with your wages. "83
John the Baptist called his hearers to behavior
changes which were more than trivial (e.g. tax gatherers
were to collect only what was legal), and yet he said not
a word to the soldiers about seeking a conscientious dis-
charge. He did tell them to be good soldiers, to not
abuse the civilian populace, and to graciously accept the
contract terms of their enlistment! Such an exhortation
is not possible for a righteous prophet indiscriminately
calling all classes of people to repentance if service in
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the military forces is inherently sinful or if the
military as an arm and institution of the state were
intrinsically evil.
Another significant example dealing with the spiritual
needs of military men must he included here. It is the
rich account which records God's redemptive dealing with
Cornelius, another Roman centurion, who along with his
household became the first Gentile converts in the apostolic
84period. Cornelius was so very earnest in seeking the
Lord that his Godly behavior became a subject for Divine
remembrance. The apostle Peter was first instructed by
means of a vision , and then commissioned, to go to
Caesarea to minister to this man. When Peter concluded
his teaching there, he baptised Cornelius and his house-
hold, but said nothing about getting out of the army, now
that Cornelius was a Christian, which was an unthinkable
omission for the Apostle Peter if service in the military
was wrong in principle.
The Apostle Paul also attested to the legitimacy of
the military career in compelling fashion. In his great
letter to the Ephesians, he began with the amazing revela-
tion of God's electing love for His people in Christ,
planned from the dim reaches of eternity before ever the
world began. Paul concludes the epistle with a ringing
call to believers to engage in the militant struggle of
spiritual warfare against the kingdom of darkness. He
strengthens the force of this call by using the metephor
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of the Roman soldier donning his armor, to show how prepared-
ness and victory are achieved. It is inconceivable that
Paul, inspired by the Holy Spirit, would use the example
of something fundamentally evil to illustrate, in great
detail, the God-given means of growing in personal righteous-
ness. Even if one rejects the Biblical claim of the in-
spired character of its contents, there is still a problem
with logic. The most radical sceptics from the school
of negative textual criticism have agreed that the
Epistle to the Ephesians is the "most authentically
Pauline" of all New Testament books, and that Paul was the
greatest intellect among New Testament writers. Can it be
seriously proposed that a writer of such demonstrated
competence and consistency would introduce so distracting
and incongruous a metaphor as to undercut the very heart
of his teaching?
Not only does the Lord Himself figure often in Scripture
as a warrior, (cf. Joshua 5- 13- 15) > but many of His greatest
prophets and choicest servants were military men, or at
least conducted military undertakings. Included in this
distinguished assembly are Abraham, Moses, Caleb, Joshua,
Gideon, Barak, Jonathan, David, Hezekiah, Jehoshaphat and
Cornelius
.
Were all this not enough to convince the doubting,
Paul commanded Timothy, a young minister, to
Suffer hardship with me as a good soldier of
Christ Jesus. No soldier in active service entangles
himself in the affairs of ordinary life, so that :
may please the one who enlisted him as a soldier.
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Again, the problem of internal or textual consistency
is raised, if Paul is interpreted as using an evil simile
to illustrate a righteous characteristic of the gospel
ministry.
In summary, we may conclude that the Bible does not
teach, nor in any way infer, that a military establishment
is basically immoral. It has been established by God
Himself as a legitimate and necessary profession, and it
is not wrong in His eyes to serve as a member of the
military. Indeed it constitutes a great sin if a citizen
refuses to render lawfully required military service. Thus
professing Christians are morally obligated to submit if
their government so orders.
The Bible does not teach a pacifistic stance toward
threats to a nation's existence and well being, and lays
down as the most fundamental duty and obligation of rulers
and magistrates the unapologetic protection of upright
citizens by appropriate punishments to transgressors of
the law, and the collective protection of the nation
against external threats to its existence.
The real problems that arise out of the need of the
military to be prepared for warfare, even when it is not
engaged in actual war, and from war itself, are not the
fault of the military structure. These grave difficulties
come from the collective and individual conduct of those
who make up the membership of a given military, and from
the government which furnishes its orders and policies.
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The understanding and successful correction of these
grave problems (to any degree) cannot take place without
the prior admission of the Biblical truths that men are
sinful by nature, that all societies of men are imperfect,
at best, and that warfare will be a part of human existence
until the Lord returns to terminate human history and judge
mankind. That part is non-negotiable.
The only choice we have in the matter of warfare is
whether we choose to understand it from a Biblical per-
spective, and whether we choose to heed the Biblical
instructions and warnings concerning its conduct and pre-
vention. It cannot be eliminated from the human experience,
and it is presumptuous at a level with blasphemy to suggest
that it can. But for those leaders of any nation who will
examine with humility the Scriptural teachings on this
unhappy subject, there is a reasonable, non-utopian hope
that conflicts can be diminished, managed to some degree
and, sometimes, even avoided. How great the tragedy of
that nation which bypasses this realistic blessing for
the illusion of total peace, thereby setting itself up
for a much worse war in the end; worse because it will be




E. BIBLICAL ETHICS AND MORAL BEHAVIOR IN WARFARE
In the previous chapter the rigid distinction between
moral behavior by military men in the context of war
fighting, and the (theoretical) ethical issue of the
existence of the military as an organization was crucial
for what is to follow. There was one issue, however, which
did not fall precisely into either category. That was the
case of a citizen who refuses to serve in the military
structure of his country when ordered to do so by his
government
.
This disobedience to lawful authority consistutes
explicit sin against the law of God, but not within the
context of Biblical standards governing military conduct.
Rather, it remains a part of the more basic issue of an
individual's responsibility to obey the legitimate govern-
ment of his land unless that government orders him to do
something that clearly and unequivocally violates the
Biblical moral law. Only under such circumstances could
a man say, as did Peter and the Apostles before the
Sanhedrin when they ordered him to cease preaching the
gospel of Jesus Christ, "We must obey God rather than
men."
88
The individual who takes such a stand takes upon him-
self the awesome responsibility of being able to demonstrate,
from Scripture, that his resistance to the pressure of the
state is based solely upon a very clearly identified viola-
tion of one or more distinct Biblical commandments. Should
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he distort the application of this one "exception" to the
requirement of obedience, he will be held accountable be-
fore God for one of the more severely condemned of all
89sins—that of rebellion and civil disobedience.
Thus, conscientious objection to military service,
unless that service requires some kind of unbiblical
conduct, is not supportable from Scripture, and serious
attempts to twist Scriptures into presumed approbation of
such a position are remarkable only for their failure.
Religious groups which advocate a conscientious objector
stance, without exception, are unable to demonstrate that
position from a Biblical context, and must resort to
traditional humanistic and moralistic arguments. Parenthe-
tically, U.S. military law permits a person to hold a
conscientious objector position, and an individual who
seeks discharge within the limits of that statement is
not breaking federal law. The point here, however, is
that this in no way changes the fact that he is still
breaking God's law, and therefore it is intellectually
and exegetically impossible to use the Bible honestly as
the basis for such a decision, even though that military
regulation permits such a possibility.
In addressing the matter of moral behavior of military
men in warfare, an important distinction in terminology
must be made
.
Ethics refers to the system, or science, of right
conduct and character which treats of the nature and grounds
of moral obligations and regard for the rights of others.
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Morals or moral conduct on the other hand, if used
precisely, refers to actual behavior carried out in accord
with perceptions of right and wrong based upon some
ethical system.
These terms will be so used in this thesis, even
though that is not the case in much of the current writing
on the subject matter related to the ethical and/or moral
aspects of warfare.
What, then, is the Biblical view of moral conduct in
warfare, and the ethical principles upon which it is
based?
The most fundamental of all ethical principles is
also the most fundamental one of sound epistemology . God
is. Because all existence has true and ultimate meaning
only as it derives from, and relates to the existence of
the immortal, unchangeable, omnipotent, eternal, Creator
of the heavens and the earth, so too, the only ehtical
system which can ever be immune to collapse is one that is
grounded in the being and character of God Himself. The
long history of philosophy's continual failure to find a
workable substitute for the person of God for giving
meaning to existence and ethics is eloquent witness to
the truth of this contention.
It is more for this reason of Divine origin than for
any other that the ten commandments have served for
millenia as the most elevated summation of high moral
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conduct the world, has ever seen, and that in spite of
countless attempts over the centuries to destroy or set
them aside.
In the preface to the decalogue the epistemological
and charac tological foundation and justification of the
law-code is clearly stated. "I am the Lord your God,
who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the
90house of slavery.' The Israelites were to obey these
commandments because God is, because God is the Lord,
because He was their Lord, and because He had brought
them out of Egypt by a might deliverance.
By direct statement and by analogy, all of the Biblical
system of ethics finds its genesis in the person of God.
God is holy, and because He is holy, and righteous and
pure, He cannot do anything evil. Indeed, He "cannot
91look upon eivl" y ~ and He is obligated by the internal
consistency of His own character to deal justly with the
commission of sins by men. The first expression of that
justness is seen in the fact that He gives mankind definite
and understandable guidelines for right conduct. Thus,
on the one hand men cannot claim ignorance of God's
standards of personal and public conduct and, on the
other, should they transgress His laws, there is no
mystery as to the standard by which they shall be judged
if they do not repent and seek His forgiveness.
As soon as one accepts the fact of God's sovereignty
over all the earth and His just prerogative to tell men
10^

how they are to behave then the issue of determining personal
conduct in warfare should be no different, in principle,
from that same process in any other area of life.
As mentioned before, if a king or leader decides to
enter into a war, he is morally obligated to make a careful
and realistic assessment of his own and the enemy's
forces
.
However, in arriving at that assessment, a leader is
to seek wise and trustworthy counsel in making his
decision, and the failure to do so can constitute evidence
of his reprobation and rejection by God.
"Prepare plans by consultation, and make war by wise
93guidance. ^ "For by wise guidance you will wage war, and
in abundance of counselors there is victory." "Where
there is no guidance, the people fall, but in abundance of
counsellors there is victory." y "Without consultation




y 3ut in contrast to the blessings of
seeking wise guidance are the solemn warnings about the
consequences of arrogant and unilateral decision making
in matters of state:
And you neglected all my counsel, and did not
want my reproof; I will even laugh at your calamity;
I will mock when your dread comes, When your dread
comes like a storm, And your calamity comes on
like a whirlwind, When distress and anguish come
on you. Then they will call on me, but I will not
answer; They will seek me diligently, but they shall
not find me, Because they hated knowledge, and did
not choose the fear of the Lord. They would not
accept my counsel, They spurned all my reproof. So
they shall eat of the fruit of their own way, And be
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satiated with their own devices. For the wayward-
ness of the naive shall kill them. But he who
listens to me shall live securely, And shall be
at east from the dread of evil. 97
In speaking of Israel's rejection of the Lord in their
times of propserity:
For they are a nation lacking in counsel, And
there is no understanding in them. Would that
they were wise, that they understood this, That
they would discern their future! How could one
chase a thousand, And two put ten thousand to
flight, Unless their Rock had sold them, And the
Lord had given them up? 98
And later on in Israel's history the same warning note
is reiterated:
Let all the earth fear the Lord; Let all the
inhabitants of the world stand in awe of Kim. For
He spoke, and it was done; He commanded, and it
stood fast. The Lord nullifies the counsel of the
nations; He frustrates the plans of the peoples.
The counsel of the Lord stands forever, The plans of
His heart from generation to generation. Blessed
is the nation whose God is the Lord, The people whom
He has chosen for His own inheritance . 99
A most instructive example of the national consequences
of ignoring the Lord was proposed to Israel as an object
lesson by Isaiah, the Prophet, in which he noted some
behavior patterns characteristic of the ungodly which have
an ominous counterpart in modern day America:
The oracle concerning Egypt. Behold, the Lord
is riding on a swift cloud, and is about to come
to Egypt; The idols of Egypt will tremble at His
presence, And the heart of the Egyptians will melt
within them.
So I will incite Egyptians against Egyptians;
And they will each fight against his brother, and
each against his neighbor. City against city, and
kingdom against kingdom. Then the spirit of the
Egyptians will be demoralized within them; And I
will confound their strategy, So that they will




Moreover, I will deliver the Egyptians into the
hand of a cruel master, And a mighty king will rule
over them," declares the Lord God of Hosts. 1°°
And further on in the prophets a similar admonition
to Babylon:
You are wearied with your many counsels; let now
the astrologers, those who prophesy by the stars,
those who predict by the new moons, stand up and
save you from what will come upon you. *•"*
And what came upon Babylon was total devastation by
the military force of a merciless enemy.
The prophet Jeremiah warned Israel that even the




rejection of the Lord and s Word, and Exekiel pro-
claimed the same message.
Assuming then, that a nation's leaders are blessed
with godly counselors, those counselors must give advice
that is consistent with God's Word if they are to enter-
tain any reasonable expectation of God's blessing upon
their efforts.
Thus, in the contemplation of possible war, certain
reasons are insufficient to justify conflict, and others
require it.
1 . Insufficient Reasons For War
First--a reasonable effort to negotiate in order
to avoid war is to be made, and is the preferred path in
104God's eyes, and in this process of preventative negotia-
tion, the ambassadors are to be treated with courtesy
and granted diplomatic immunity. The failure to do so
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can in itself constitute a just cause for war, inasmuch as
105the envoys were legitimate representatives of the state. J
War is not permissible for reasons of greed (the
commandment which forbids coveting applies to both
individuals and nations) or lust for power and prestige.
Reasons of ideology and theocratic presumption
are also unacceptable, for theocratic justification is no
longer valid (there have been no legitimate theocracies
except Israel before the time of Christ) , and ideological
reasons are essentially spiritual deviations from God's
word which should be dealt with using spiritual means.
Of course, an ideological conviction can lead one nation
to make war on another, and the latter would then behave
quite properly in resisting any military threat caused by
the ideological assumptions. Conversely, an attempt
to wage war for ideological reasons constitutes a pre-
sumption that the Almighty has conferred upon one nation
the right and responsibility to correct the spiritual
107
shortcomings of its neighbors by means of warfare.
There is a particular irony here in America's case,
for as we have rejected the knowledgeability of an absolute
God, or of any absolutes in standards of conduct which
derive from His being and person, we have tended to become
more absolute about the reasons for which we wage war!
Instead of limited and reasonable goals of warfare, which
would be consequences of mature statecraft (such as forcing
the enemy to withdraw from occupied territory) , we have
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gone to war for incredibly arrogant and absolute reasons
such as "making the world safe for democracy" or uncondition-
al surrender "of the enemy." The sad result of this has
been that our enemies on occasion have fought like
cornered rats when that could have been avoided and then,
in spite of the terrible cost in bloodshed, we have "lost
the peace" as well.
Genuine peace is the most desirable state of
affairs for a nation, and it is simply not possible to
justify a pre-emptive attack upon a peaceable neighbor for
any reason. Any nation that so behaves will be punished
by God Himself. 108
2 . Sufficient or Just Reasons for War
The first, and most obvious and legitimate reason
for a nation going to war is if it has war declared against
it, or if it becomes the object of invasion or attack
across its borders, even if war has not formally been
declared.
Thus Judah was justified (and blessed of God) in
attacking the countries whose armies invaded its territory,
109 110 111including those of the Syrians, 7 Moabites, Midianites,
112
and the Philistines.
A subset, or variant of this, is war for the
purpose of recovering territory that has recently been lost,
as distinct from irredentist claims which may span centuries
113
since the alleged or actual loss. J The inferential
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argument from Scripture concerning this distinction lies
in the fact that there is no precept, or historical
example for a precedent, to justify an irredentist war.
War may also be conducted for the purpose of
evicting an occupation army, although this point must be
handled with great care, as far as the Old Testament is
concerned.
The unique issue here is the existence of the
Judean theocracy as a legitimate political entity. There
have been many attempts to insitute theocracies through-
out history, as far ranging and varied as the Mayans in-
Central America, and the Philistines in the Mid-East.
But in the eyes of God, they were not legitimate because
(1) He did not ordain and institute them and (2) they
were established by men under the (imagined) headship of
one or more pagan deities.
Only Israel, from the time of Moses until the time
of Samuel, meets all the Biblical criteria for a pure
theocracy. God instituted the nation, with Himself as
titular Head of State, involving Himself in the day to
day affairs of the nation.
In this capacity, He dealt with Israel as a Father
does with a son, and when the nation sinned against Him
and His commandments, the Lord would chasten His people,
nearly always through the instrumentality of foreign
invasion and occupation. In almost every such instance,
the hated invaders were allowed--by God--to remain until
110

His people had repented of their sins and turned from their
evil ways. When this had been accomplished then the Lord
would graciously raise up a leader, or otherwise providen-
tially deliver His people from thier oppressors.
It is this spiritual chastisement (remembering
that in the theocracy the political and the religious were
indistinguishable) by means of warfare and its attendant
problems which cannot be legitimately replicated today as
a causus bellum . There are no true theocracies today, and
none can validly lay claim to such status. Hence, the
eviction of occupation forces, while legitimate as a function
and responsibility of the civil state, cannot be undertaken
for precisely the same reasons as was done in Israel. The
applicable Biblical basis for eviction of an enemy force
is simply that God has committed to sovereign states the
power of the sword for protection of the citizens of that
state from internal or external threats.
An interesting case in the history of Israel is
particularly instructive concerning the continued right
to retain possession of territory after centuries of
occupation.
In the Exodus, Moses had sought peaceable passage
11^for the Israelites with payment, if necessary, for any
water used while going through the territory of the
Mo rites, the Moabites and the Edomites. With the
refusal of this request of "innocent passage," these
111

nations attacked God's wandering people and were defeated
by Israel, who occupied some parts of their territories. J
Hundreds of years later in the days of the Judges,
Jephthah was confronted with a request "by the king of the
Amorites to return these lands, and refused on the basis
of the initial refusal of the right of innocent passage
and the outcome of the resulting war.
One further ethical principle for sovereign states
emerges from a study of this passage. If a state seeks
the right of innocent passage through the territory of
another, without seeking to obtain territory as a result of
that passage, and particularly if adequate compensation for
any use or damage is offered, then passage cannot be
justly refused. If it is refused, the refusal constitutes
a sufficient cause for war. This may be properly inferred
from this incident on the basis of God's declared super-
natural strengthening of Israel and blessing the
victorious outcome.
Another cause of war legitimized in Scripture is
that of entering combat on behalf of a threatened or
attacked ally. However, there is a crucial proviso to
this. The qualification is that the treaty or agreement
existing between the sovereign states in question must be
proper in" Biblical terms.
Mutual defense and assistance treaties are not to
be made with nations that hate the Lord and His principles
of righteousness, nor with nations that have had a long
112

record of untrustworthiness and hostility. If such
treaties are made, that may well constitute sufficient
cause in God's eyes for chastening such national
117disobedience. '
And it should be remembered that while there is
no longer any true theocracy as such, the Lord not only
claims Lordship over all the nations on the face of the
earth, but holds them to account for their conduct, their
relationship to Him, chastens them for iniquity and
1 1 flblesses them for obedience to His word.
Once a covenant is made, however, it is to be
honored, even if it is less than ideal. We find a stunning
example of covenant fidelity in the example of Joshua who
was tricked by the Gibeonites into making a mutual defense
treaty with them. Later on, when Joshua realized he had
been tricked, he not only honored that covenant, but even
protected the Gibeonites militarily when they were
119
endangered by the jealous Amo rites.
Finally, it must be pointed out that not only does
a sovereign state have the power of the sword ordained by
120God for the purpose of protecting its citizens, and
punishing those who commit evil, but it has the power to
levy taxes on its citizens to support a standing army and/
121 . .
or police force. It is the duty of citizens to serve
in the armed forces if required to do so, and to pay the
taxes required to maintain these forces as well.
113

3. Moral Conduct of Soldiers in Warfare
The logical first requirement of military ethics
spelled out in Scripture for the soldier is best seen in
Paul's example of good soldiering as a model for the
conduct of the Christian ministry. "Suffer hardship with
me, as a good soldier of Christ Jesus. No soldier in
active service entangles himself in the affairs of every-
day life, so that he may please the one who enlisted him
122
as a soldier."
The clear inference here is that a soldier, in
order to carry out his duties in a responsible and
honorable manner, must give up certain privileges and
opportunities (if not rights) of civilian citizenship
for the duration of his service. Soldiering is an intense
and demanding occupation, one that inherently demands
certain personal sacrifices of each one so committed. In-
deed, it could be argued that a military organization which
tries to duplicate all the privileges of the civilian life
style within the military or, put another way, which tries
to suggest there is no real sacrifice involved in enlist-
ment, may well be laying a groundwork for the ultimate
demoralization of its troops when a time of testing,
sacrifice and hardship comes.
Without exception, each individual entering the
military is warned by Scripture to have right attitudes
about their occupation and its conduct. Under no
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circumstances is war to be enjoyed, or gloried in :
Show Thyself strong, God, who has acted on our
behalf. . . .He has scattered the peoples who
delight in war. 123
124
And, "He who rejoices at calamity will not go unpunished."
And for those who "live by the sword," in the sense that
soldiering is an obsession, Christ warns that they shall
12^
"die by the sword." J War is to be understood as one of
the most tragic manifestations of the sinfulness of man,
and the discerning soldier, especially if he is a
Christian, should enter his occupation with an attitude
that might be described as intelligent and responsible
heavy heartedness.
Nevertheless, these admonitions are not to be
misconstrued so as to suggest that a soldier should fight
halfheartedly, since he is in a sometimes distasteful and
tragic business. He is to do whatever he is commanded
1 of\
to the best of his ability, including combat. Indeed,
Scripture clearly teaches that mature courage in warfare
127is distinctly a gift of God xo those who trust in Him,
and in the Lord's exhortation to the sons of Israel when
Joshua took command of their army there is a clear linkage
between true godliness and courage in a military undertak-
ing. In one of the more remarkable events in the
history of God's chosen people, when Joshua speaks to them
immediately after being appointed to the office of commander-
in-chief by the Lord Himself, the people respond with a





In the issue of courage and commitment as an
indispensable requirement of responsible soldiering, each
individual so engaged is required to understand that his
courage and strength is to come from the Lord, and no-
130
where else. •* Nowhere is it more painfully obvious than
in battle that the "arm of flesh" alone will fail.
Trusting in the Lord for his strength and
courage, a soldier is protected from pride, from paralyzing
fear, and from foolish presumption about his own capabilities
Of all the Biblical principles which apply universally to
mankind, perhaps none applies so consistently as the
Biblical warning about pride: "Pride goes before
131destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall." -* Even
pagan and ignorant, as well as sophisticated cultures,
have recognized that excessive pride can mean the downfall
of an individual or nation, and by virtue of its unique
functions, dress, and role, the military profession has
always been a fertile field in which the tares of pride
could quickly take root and flourish. Thus, even though
"pride" is perhaps the most stressed of all ideological
and pedagogical notions in the U.S. forces, in the eyes of
God the attitude of pride constitutes the greatest possible
danger to a soldier. Trusting in the Lord's sufficiency
alone is the only means of escape from this snare.
Once the ethically oriented soldier enters into
battle, there are still Biblical guidelines and constraints
which are to govern his conduct.
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First, when an enemy is given the opportunity to
surrender, and does, then he is to be treated with a
degree of mercy (i.e. he should be taken prisoner, vice
1 32being slain, although his goods may still be confiscated) . J
Conversely, if he refuses surrender, then he may be killed
in battle without any violation of God's moral law.
When an enemy is defeated and taken prisoner, he
is to be treated in a non-barbaric fashion, but at the
same time he should not become the object of sentimental
forgiveness that blurs the combatant status while the war
is in progress. Because wicked king Ahab (of Israel) was
excessively tolerant in his treatment of his cruel
adversary, the Syrian king Ben-hadad, God sent a prophet
to Ahab to inform him that he would forfeit his life for
his foolish snatching of defeat from the jaws of a God-
133given victory. JJ In other words, prisoners of war are
to be treated as such, not tortured, but not pampered
either.
Whether in peace or war, soldiers are to confine
their acts of military violence to enemy combatants.
Civilians are not to be cruelly treated or unnecessarily
killed, and even in peacetime a soldier is obligated to
134behave circumspectly among the civilian populace. J War-
fare is a terrible, "demoralizing" activity by almost any
standard, and its very nature of violence, death, pain and
horror can numb the conscience of the best of men. Under-
standing this, one can perhaps appreciate more the gracious
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wisdom of God in making provision for this great difficulty
in requiring a disciplined life style for soldiers, even in
peacetime. Hence, conduct of the military persons among
civilians assumes a major importance for the long term
benefit of soldiers, and should not be slighted by a dis-
cerning commander for any reason.
So concerned is the Almighty for a disciplined
approach to the severe problems of combat that He even
gave explicit commands concerning the treatment of the
environment during battle
:
When you besiege a city a long time, to make
war against it in order to capture it, you shall
not destroy its trees by swinging an axe against
them; for you may eat from them, and you shall not
cut them down. For is the tree of the field a
man, that it should be besieged by you?
Only the trees which you know are not fruit
trees you shall destroy and cut down, that you
may construct siegeworks against the city that is
making war with you until it falls. 1 35
Needless destruction of food bearing, hence, life-
supporting resources is not to be considered, even if
they would have a high, short term utility cost and an
immediate value in a tactical crisis. The long term price
of lost resources and diminished sense of restraint would
be too high, even for the victors.
The use of strategems and deception is also
explicitly permitted in Scripture--though only in the
context of warfare. In the Exodus passage, celebrated
because of its apparently contradictory ethics (contradic-
tory, it might be noted, only for those who cannot grasp
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the Biblical distinction between the requirements for
personal morality and the ethical principles governing a
nation in a state of war) , we find the Lord declared as
richly blessing the two Hebrew midwives who refused to
kill the Israelite male babies at Pharoah's command. '
They accomplished this by lying to Pharoah. It is impossible
to explain how a righteous God could countenance such
conduct except by a wartime contingency—as was the case.
In a similar vein, Joshua used deception very
effectively in several of the battles of the Canaan
campaign, as did other great commanders throughout the
history of Judah and Israel. A kind of subset of strategy
and deception is the gathering of substantive intelligence
about the enemy. And this too is unequivocally mandated
in Scripture. The most celebrated instance of this is the
group of twelve spies who were sent out by Moses to spy on
137 . . . «the promised land. " It is enlightening that Scripture
faithfully records God's severe judgment on an entire
generation of adults (except Joshua and Caleb) because
they, and 10 of the 12 spies, pessimistically and dis-
honestly slanted the intelligence which had been gathered. ^
Gentlemen, even Christian gentlemen, dc_ read
other people's mail—in wartime.
Finally, it should be noted that a commanding
officer bears the great responsibility for being honest
with his men about the nature and threat of the enemy,
for warning them to trust first and only in the Lord,
and for warning them to aquit themselves like men in battle.
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Perhaps the words of King Hezekiah, one of the
greatest kings of Judah, are still one of the best examples
of a godly "balance between encouragement and warning to
ones men:
Now when Hezekiah saw that Sennacherib had come
and that he intended to make war on Jerusalem, he
decided with his officers and his warriors to cut
off the supply of water from the springs which were
outside the city; and they helped him.
So many people assembled and stopped up all
the springs and the stream which flowed through the
region, saying, "Why should the kings of Assyria
come and find abundant water?"
And he took courage and rebuilt all the wall
that had been broken down, and erected towers on it,
and built another outside wall, and strengthened
Millo in the city of David, and made weapons and
shields in great number.
And he appointed military officers over the
people, and gathered them to him in the square
at the city gate, and spoke encouragingly to them,
saying, "Be strong and courageous, do not fear or
be dismayed because of the king of Assyria, nor be-
cause of all the multitude which is with him; for
the one with us is greater than the one with him.
With him is only an arm of flesh, but with us is
the Lord our God to help us and to fight our
battles." And the people relied on the words of
Hezekiah king of Judah. ^39
F. THE JUST WAR
Having examined the Biblical principles concerning
statecraft, the right of governments to exist, the
responsibility of governments to bear the sword for the
protection of its citizens, the ethical principles
constraining government's involvement in warfare and,
finally, the moral behavior required of members of the
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military, the question which remains to be addressed from
a Biblical standpoint is, "What constitutes a just war?"
Because this issue has become so emotionally charged
in the United States, it is appropriate to recall that
the Biblical concept of a just war and the American
traditional-humanist concept of a just war are very
different indeed. In some points they are even antithetical
—yet they are often confused.
While the first category of a just war is no longer
possible (because there is no longer any earthly theocracy,
and because direct, verbal, short term revelation ceased
with the completion of the book of Revelation)
,
a
consideration of its nature should be included in order
to clarify the underlying and valid ethical framework.
When God, Himself, usually through His prophets, ordered
His people to go to war against a nation which had become
intolerably wicked and idolatrous, in order to punish--or
exterminate--them, obviously that war was just by every
ethical standard of the Bible. Such a war was so just
and righteous that failure to carry it out, precisely as
God commanded, carried with it an extreme penalty. This,
in fact, is what happened to King Saul when he failed to
kill all the Amalekites and their animals as God had
commanded. For this disobedience he lost his kingship
141
and was confirmed in a reprobate status forever.
Today, if anyone should claim (as was done in the
Crusades) that he had been commissioned to undertake a
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"holy war" against some "heathen" or "infidels," that
individual would be acting contrary to Scripture. God
no longer speaks by direct revelation to His people, He
speaks through His inspired and authoritative Word. He
no longer heads an earthly political theocracy, and His
kingdom is "not of this world;" otherwise Jesus 's servants
would have fought on His behalf with weapons of warfare
Ik?
at the time of his arrest. There are no more "holy"
wars, nor can there be, until Christ returns at the head
of the armies of heaven on the Day of Judgment.
The purposes of warfare since the second destruction
of Jerusalem are more mundane, and yet the ethical
principles of conduct required for those involved in their
planning and/or execution have not changed. If we are
willing to admit that God Himself saw fit to conduct His
warfare against disobedient nations by means of His people,
then we can better understand the nature and universality
of warfare and, looking to His example and instructions,
be preserved from moral decay when involved in combat.
The second order of justification for going to war
is still 3iblical, but not as a consequence of direct
Divine verbal command. Rather, it results from the
perception of, and response to, unmistakable jeopardy
to a nation's existence. As suggested already, in the
case of actual attack there is no longer any meaningful
question about the threat, and a nation so abused is just,
and justified in prosecuting a defensive war.
122

However, among ethical men those anguished souls
concerned with warfare and related subjects have agonized
over the most vexatious and difficult circumstances with
respect to war between nations. This is the painful
matter of a pre-emptive attack. It is ever justified?
Can it be?
Charles Hodge, a great American theologian, in the
section on War in his three-volume Systematic Theology
,
admits to this extreme difficulty, and allows the
possibility of pre-emptive attack if a certain set of
stringent criteria are met.
It is conceded that war is one of the most
dreadful evils that can be inflicted on a people;
that it involves the destruction of property and
life; that it demoralizes both the victors and the
vanquished; that it visits thousands of non-com-
batants with all the miseries of poverty, widowhood,
and orphanage; and that it tends to arrest the
progress of society in everything that is good and
desirable. God overrules wars in many cases, as
He does the tornado and the earthquake, to the
accomplishment of His benevolent purposes, but
this does not prove that war in itself is not a
great evil. He makes the wrath of man to praise
Him. It is conceded that wars undertaken to
gratify the ambition, cupidity, or resentment of
rulers or people, are unchristian and wicked. It
is also conceded that the vast majority of the
wars which have desolated the world have been un-
justifiable in the sight of God and man. Neverthe-
less it does not follow from this that war in all
cases is to be condemned.
This is proved because the right of self-
defense belongs to nations as well as to
individuals. Nations are bound to protect the
lives and property of their citizens. If these
are assailed by force, force may be rightfully
used in their protection. Nations also have the
right to defend their own existence. If that be
endangered by the conduct of other nations, they
have the natural right of self-protection. A war
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may tie defensive and yet in one sense aggressive.
In other words, self-defense may dictate and
render necessary the first assault. A man is not
bound to wait until a murderer actually strikes
his blow. It is enough that he sees undeniable
manifestations of a hostile purpose. So a nation
is not bound to wait until its territories
are actually invaded and its citizens murdered,
before it appeals to arms. It is enough that there
is clear evidence on the part of another nation
of an intention to commence hostilities. While it
is easy to lay down the principle that war is
justifiable only as a means of self-defense, the
practical application of this principle is beset
with difficulties. The least aggression on
national property, or the slightest infringement
of national rights, may be regarded as the first
step toward national extinction, and therefore
justify the most extreme measures of redress. A
nation may think that a certain enlargement of
territory is necessary to its security, and, there-
fore, that it has the right to go to war to secure
it. So a man may say that a portion of his
neighbour's farm is necessary to the full enjoyment
of his own property, and therefore that he has
the right to appropriate it to himself. It is to
be remembered that nations are as much bound by
the moral law as individual men; and therefore that
what a man may not do in the protection of his own
rights, and on the plea of self-defense, a nation
may not do. A nation therefore is bound to exercise
great forbearance, and to adopt every other avail-
able means of redressing wrongs, before it plunges
itself and others into all the demoralizing miseries
of war. 1^3
The crucial touchstone and weakest point in Hodge's
historically sound summary of Christian theology on the
subject of war is what, exactly, constitutes " clear
evidence on the part of another nation of an intention
to commence hostilities." (my ixalics)
He is writing here about non-verbal as well as verbal
communication (both rife with potential for misunderstand-
ing and confusion) in the most drastic, sensitive and
emotional of all issues in the lives of men and nations.
12^

And he is talking about the highly individualistic issue
of interpretation of what constitutes "clear" evidence.
What one side may perceive as clear evidence (colored
by its own culture, history, battle order, etc., etc.) of
hostile intent, another may see as only ordinary military
and governmental behavior.
The discernment of intentions is the plague of
international relations, especially in times of war, or
pre-war tension, and history proves that the intentions
of one government are rarely perceived with exactitude by
another. The variables which affect the outworking of
intentions are endless, and there exists no system of
analysis for even identifying all of them, much less
assessing correctly the relative significance of their
multiple interrelationships. Assessment of correct inten-
tion in the matter of possible warfare, is beyond human
capabilities for all practical purposes. Obviously, the
problem must be approached from a different direction.
Parenthetically, any warning about assessment of
intentions must not be to foster disregard or disinterest
in the vital problem of intentions. Rather, in a proper
concern for ethical behavior of a government at a time of
impending warfare, this warning note should stimulate
careful assessment in other areas as well. Discovery of
enemy battle order and evaluation of their combat hardware




In the late 1930' s, there was intense and. widespread
debate about Nazi Germany's intentions. It is sobering to
realize that this debate was singularly unsuccessful in
preparing the European community for the reality of
Hitlerite aggression. The observable fact of the rearmament
of Germany was first ignored, by the media and government
leaders, then suppressed as long as possible, and finally
admitted when it was too late to recover national strength.
A nation then, has a responsibility to honestly and
soberly monitor the military capabilities of its neighbors.
An increase in arms acquisition should be faced as a
reality which may significantly change the balance and
relationship between the countries. Pre-emptive attack
is still not justified unless, of course, the arming nation
states clearly that it has hostile intentions. This is
sufficiently rare, however, to be non-normative. Besides,
such a declaration of intent is regarded in international
law as the equivalent of a declaration of war, and within
the framework of that law code any nation which becomes
the object of such a declaration would be justified in
going to war, including preparation of the means for a
pre-emptive attack.
The more usual situation is for an aggressor nation to
attempt concealment of its hostile intentions, and often
this has been fairly successful. But the very scope and
nature of modern mechanical, technologically sophisticated
warfare is such that full concealment in the final stages
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of preparation for an attack becomes difficult, if not
impossible. Germany's elaborate preparations for the
invasion of the U.S.S.R. are a classic example of this
phenomenon. That Stalin and members of his power elite
could not--or refused to— read correctly these multitudinous
signals is beside the point. Certainly Stalin would have
been justified in pre-emptively attacking the Wermacht
forces in Poland once the latter' s preparations became
obvious, intense, sustained and directional.
The ethical issue in focus has to do with the difficult,
yet necessary, business of "reading evidence." The same
144
Lord who warned men against judging the hearts of others
in the severest of terms also commanded all men to evaluate
behavior (especially of leaders) wisely, and against
Biblical standards. J We cannot judge the thoughts and
intents of the heart of another as God can, but we can and
must be involved in a continual process of evaluation of
behavioral evidence. In other words, both personally and
corporately, we must diligently strive to distinguish
between unfounded judgments and necessary conclusions
based upon careful observation and analysis of verbal and
non-verbal evidence.
Once a decision to act i_s made, the accountability
before God for the integrity, Biblicity and care of that
decision rests with the decision maker. Properly
appreciated, it can act as a powerful restraint upon
premature decisions or rash judgments in a time of national
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peril, while not shutting the door to intelligent response
to correctly perceived threat. There is a clear analogy
here to the individual who decides that his government is
forcing him to do something unbiblical, thereby permitting
him to resist the lawful authorities. The onus is entirely
upon that individual (evidentially and Biblically) to
demonstrate the reality of the governmental sin, and failure
to do so will bring him God's most severe wrath. Direct
accountability to God Himself--if believed—constitutes
the profoundest and most effective restraint upon needlessly
aggressive behavior or premature military action.
Ultimately, there is no way for national leaders to
avoid the necessity of collective personal judgments and
intuitions about a perceived threat. The key question is
whether the perceptions, conclusions and decisions resolved
have been accomplished in as Biblical an attitude and way
as possible. If such a concerted effort is not made, it
is virtually certain that the decision to attack will not
be considered "just" in the hindsight of history.
The institutional church has not always stood firmly
and Scripturally on this issue, for in the early centuries
of the New Testament Church, "there was a great disin-
clination to engage in military service, and the (church)
fathers at times justified the reluctance by calling the
lawfulness of all wars into question." But is instructive
to note that once the Roman Empire became Christian, and
the cross had been substituted for the eagle in the
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standards of the Army, the opposition from the church
died away, "till at length we hear of fighting prelates,
and of military orders of monks." '
Likewise, the architects of the Reformation saw that
there was a Biblical theology of warfare, and consistent
with that understanding, not a single confession of the
Reformation declared all war to be unlawful. The Augsburg
Confession expressly stated that it was proper for Christins
to act as magistrates and, among other things, to conduct
war, etc
.
It has been only in the last seventy-five to a hundred
years that a large segment of the visible church has
swung back, once again, to a pacifist position. In pagan
Rome the objections of early Christians arose mostly out
of the fear of serving in an army that was being used to
persecute the Christian church. This reason, at least,
could be argued Biblically from the principle forbidding
participation in that which suppresses the preaching of
the gospel. Today, the ecclesiastical justification for
pacifism is nowhere so near to a Scriptural position as
was that of the early church fathers, but rests entirely
on humanistic presuppositions. It is surely no accident
that the rise of this kind of thinking paralleled the rise
of speculative and skeptical theology.
For a war to be just, then, it must be entered upon
for the right reasons, and conducted in the right way.
It must be countenanced only for causes legitimized in the
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Bible, and it must be carried out within the ethical
framework laid down there. To admit of any lesser set of
standards, however appealing to the twentieth century
humanistic intellect, is to attempt to remove the matter
from the sacred authority of God Himself. Of all things
a mortal can do, this is the most foolish and sinful, when
one considers that all men shall stand before God at the
end of time to account for what they have done in the
flesh.
The theme of a just war is really a subset of a whole
ethical theory of statecraft found in Scripture. As noted
earlier, the American doctrine of the just war has
rigorously sought (artificially) to separate war from the
other means and instruments of national policy. The
result has been an incredible system of contradictory
notions attempting to both repudiate and justify war in a
totally inadequate philosophical context. Not surprisingly
the results have been chaotic for the United States in the
seventies
.
The determination then, of whether a war can be, or is,
just must begin long before such a war takes place. The
decision can ethically be made only if leaders hold to an
intellectually honest realism concerning the nature of man,
and the Biblical responsibility incumbent upon politicians to
discharge their evaluative and decision making processes in
submission to the ethical standards set down in God's word.
Nations, and national leaders, even in their collective
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role, do not cease to labor under the behavioral account-
ability before God that applies to individuals, insofar as
the methodology of their own personal dynamics are con-
cerned in the larger process of statecraft. Only with this
kind of ethical stature, will they be in a position to
exercise the responsible and sensitive discernment necessary
in attempting collectively and responsibly to determine
adversary intentions and capabilities vis-a-vis the national
interests of the state they serve.
Certainly, the ethical nation is at an apparent
"disadvantage," compared to the ruthless dictatorship or
ruling oligarchy, in the matter of starting the war. It
is more difficult for a responsible military planner to
prepare mainly for defensive war, and to be constrained
in taking the initiative, if that is justified. It is
more difficult to concern outselves with the question of
how ought men to make the political decision in the areas
of foreign policy and military affairs rather than what
a particular decision should be in a given situation or
crisis. It is more difficult to clarify the theological
and philosophical grounds upon which men should make judgments
about the justness of war and preparations for a just war,
than to try to fit a set of contradictory and simplistic
slogans to each new test of national will on an ad hoc
basis. In short, it is much more difficult to think
carefully than to act--to do something , anything, once a
crisis occurs. Yet, a nation which so disciplines itself
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(thereby avoiding aggrandizing behavior towards its neigh-
bors) without retreating to sentimental pacifism under the
guise of "pure" defense, will be richly blessed of God in
the end. As with nearly everything laid down in Scripture
for the benefit of mankind, the best way is seldom the
easiest. Indeed, it is usually the hardest in the short
term, but over time proves to have been by far the wisest,
and most blessed.
Twenty-five years ago, in a speech in Washington, D.C.,
Thomas E. Murray succinctly captured the very essence of
this historic Christian (and Biblical) view of war—and
our present day loss of that perspective:
The Christian effort at peace-making, from its
origin, undertook the task of civilizing warfare.
It set itself against pacifism: the notion that
war is always immoral. But it set itself even
more strongly against barbarism: the notion that
the use of armed force is not subject to any
moral restraints. Against these two extremes tradi-
tion asserts that war can be a moral action, but
only if it is limited in its purposes and methods
by the norms of justice.
The fact today is that the Christian tradition
of civilized warfare has been ruptured. The chief
cause of the rupture has been the doctrine of total
war fought to total victory: the kind of victory
that looks to the total ruin of the enemy nation.
This doctrine of totalization of war represents a
regression toward barbarism. It is contrary to the
central assertion of the civilized tradition that
the aims of war are limited, and the use of force
in war is likewise limited, not merely by political
and military counsels of expediency, but primarily
by the moral principle of justice .3-^8
In an imperfect world sin cannot be eliminated. But
its worst effects can be minimized and controlled, if the
means and purposes used to do so are consistent with God's
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word. Hence, the assumption of perfectibility, or of the
capacity to eradicate what God has declared will not
disappear from the present order, is to contradict arrogantly
the Almighty Himself, and set ourselves up for disaster.
For God to bless our efforts in any scale of endeavor,
our motives, methods and goals must be brought into
conformity to His word, at least to the extent that such an
effort is seriously made. Hence, to attempt to eliminate
war is to undertake a Utopian effort that will end in
certain tragedy and frustration. To minimize and limit
warfare through ethical statecraft is to accept humbly
the non-negotiable parameters which God Himself has set
upon human existence --and thereby to be blessed with
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ship of faith and works.
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only to the original manuscripts of Scripture. Since
these manuscripts were inspired they were free from
error. The originals are lost and we are today in
possession only of copies, copies which contain textual
errors and difficulties that no serious Christian
can afford to ignore. These copies, however, do give
the actual Word of God. No point of doctrine has been
affected. The doctrine shines before us in all its
purity. Why God was not pleased to preserve the
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in His infinite wisdom, He did not wish us to bow
down to these manuscripts as unto images. Perhaps
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the text of the original.
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Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1957. p. 61.
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There is a growing crisis in the U.S. national domestic
and foreign policy at the highest levels of government.
The most immediate and dangerous aspect of this crisis is
the strategic nuclear situation, wherein the American de-
fense posture has eroded so badly that we are decidedly
inferior to the Russians with respect to conventional,
as well as strategic weapons. Furthermore, we appear to
be less and less able or willing to act decisively in the
international arena, and lack a workable philosophy for
charting and implementing a recovery of U.S. national
purpose and foreign policy initiative. In 1978 a spectrum
of ominous signals has been received from a number of
allied and non-aligned countries indicating that they view
America as having fallen from its position of leadership
of the free world, and as unable to recover its former
momentum. One highly placed U.S. governmental official
is reported to have stated recently, "nothing works anymore."
The central hypothesis of this study is that our
current serious and complex dilemma is not the fault of;
inexorable fate, or international circumstances beyond our
control. Rather, the vexatious foreign policy and defense
problems with which we struggle are the predictable
(certainly not surprising) and inevitable consequences of
profoundly significant choices made seventy-five to a
141

hundred years ago. Furthermore these choices had a
demonstrably common heritage, which was the substitution
of western, secularized humanism for a Biblical-theological
cosmology. These 'choices, with increasingly awesome effects
since World War II, were made in every important area of
American life. Theology was dethroned as the Queen of the
Sciences, and replaced by the god of presumed chance in
the new religion of scientism. No longer were men required
to undertake their technological discoveries and applications
in the service of their Creator, and accountable to Him.
Rather, man became accountable only to mankind in the
abstract, and he discovered that mankind has created not
only a monster out of control, but also that he made a
miserably ineffective god as well, especially in controlling
and using that technology for lasting good.
In public education the purpose changed radically
from building character and imparting wisdom, as the two
most vital aspects of knowledge, to that of simply acquiring
facts. Thanks in large measure to the archetypal false
prophet John Dewey, all the horrendous problems of mankind
(poverty, war, disease, social unrest, etc.) came to be
regarded as appurtenant consequences of ignorance. If
only enough people could be given sufficient education,
man's social problems would largely disappear, and man-
kind would realize the new millenium. With the cavalier
discard of the Biblical doctrine of sin, man lost his
ability to understand himself, and public education became
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a mighty instrument for ideological utopianism, social
degeneracy, and individual corruption. We forgot that an
educated scoundrel was far more dangerous to society than
an ignorant one, and that knowledge without character,
integrity, self-discipline and a clear sense of account-
ability to a higher authority becomes fatal to the society
which holds it to its bosom.
Perhaps the greatest betrayal of all took place in
the institutional churches as ministers and theologicans
began, first, to question the historical trustworthiness,
authority and supernatural origin of the Bible, and ended
by discarding it entirely, while still retaining the out-
ward form of the church of the Lord Jesus Christ. The
consequences for America were severe. The social gospel
of the here-and-now raised false expectations of the
perfectibility of man (indeed becoming the philosophical
seedbed of the vast social welfare legislation in the 1950-
60's), and diverted men's attention from a God to Whom they
would someday have to give account for their deeds in the
flesh. With the denial of afterlife, of judgment, of
heaven and hell, all the spiritual constraints which for
centuries seemed to limit the iniquity of men were basically
lost, and America entered a period of moral looseness and
self-indulgence unprecedented in history. In addition, the
institutional church lost its credibility as the standard
of ethical discernment, often being in the very forefront
of each new scandalous degeneracy, with the result that it
1^3

became simply irrelevant to the American people, and
frequently an object of contempt.
In politics, ethical conduct gave way to morality by
assumed consensus, and since then has proved to be an
elusive commodity to pin down. The primary determinant
of political decision making has come to be whatever each
legislator and politican "feels," at that moment, will
best serve to get him re-elected. As politicians are
seen by the public to be less and less ethical, and more
willingly corrupted, they are increasingly despised by
the electorate, while they pander to the public that scorns
them in order to gain votes at election time. In return
they scorn those they are elected to serve. The public
has become cynical about the government, and is willing,
as never before, to "use" the government (which in turn is
taxing it into financial ruin) to provide for its every
need. There has been developed a vicious cycle of mutual
negative reinforcement, with each segment contributing to
the degeneracy of the other.
In the field of foreign policy, we have long since set
aside any pretense of mature statecraft, for that demands
a mature and realistic assessment of man's nature. Our
founding fathers believed the Biblical truth of sin, and
accordingly designed a marvellously wise system of balanced
government, based directly on the New Testament structure
of (republican) church government. But we have declared
ourselves wiser than they and, having set aside a more
1Zj4

humble picture of man, have put in its place the new
self-made man whose heart, as well as his feet, is made
of clay. Perfectible, evolved and evolving man must
continually reassure himself that he is getting better all
the time. Our particularly superficial and self-centered
interpretation of history demands the rigid maintenance
of a view of ourselves that is both messianic and self-
righteous, and we feel not only a deep compulsion to force
our (bankrupt) philosophy down the throats of our inter-
national neighbors, but at the same time lust after every
crumb of approval from them, real or imagined. Because
we no longer believe in the gracious acceptance of a
forgiving God who mercifully adopts those who trust in
Him, we are frantic in our efforts to find, and force,
evidence that we are loved, for if we are not loved, we
cannot sustain the fiction that we are "good" and hence
worthy of being loved. If ever the tail could be said to
be wagging the dog, it is surely to be seen in the spectacle
of a great nation prostituting its awesome potential and
opportunity for intelligent and wise leadership in a chaotic
world for the pathetic crumbs of the imagined (but short
term and self-destructive) advantage of being "liked."
The irony is redoubled when we realize that we struggle
most for signals of approval from our enemies (for if we
get them, then we can know we are successful in our search
for the unholy grail of messianic populism) while at the
same time doing everything short of outright hostility to
IkS

alienate our "best allies. In all probability the genesis
of our discomfort and contempt of countries like Rhodesia,
Korea, and South Africa is that they possess a sense of
national purpose—however misguided according to our
lights—which we no longer possess. And the implied
rebuke in that is too much to bear. After all, denying the
truth about ourselves is what this is all about.
In the broadest of terms, the seat of our problems
is not in public policy, not in technology, not in defense,
not in education, It is in the realm of the spiritual and
philosophical. Furthermore, it is going to be difficult
beyond description to correct, for the collective runoff
of untruth over a century has built a flash flood momentum
that only the power and grace of Almighty God Himself can
reverse. It will be difficult to correct, because the
changes needed must take place in men's souls as well as
in men's minds--and it is hard to convince men of the
importance of this when many deny that man even has a
soul! We have, in almost every way, rejected God and His
Word, and with that the national and personal blessing
which came to those who love Him. Scripture indicates
that when a people persistently reject him, in time God
will reject them. Since any nation is saved from destruc-
tion, in the last analysis, only by His grace and fore-
bearance, when that grace is removed destruction is
inevitable, unless that nation repents.
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Lest we retreat into despair, it is well to remember
that there have been several occasions in history when
God was pleased to halt the process of social and moral
decay in a nation, and restore it to a condition of grace.
England, in the days of John Wesley and George Whitfield
had sunk into such deep moral depravity and social decay
that the historical accounts by English writers of that
day read like present day descriptions of gangster life in
New York City. Yet, within a few short years, primarily
through the instrumentality of the thoroughly Biblical
preaching of these two men, England underwent a breath-
taking transformation. In a few short years there was a
recovery of national purpose, a sharp drop in crime, the
churches were filled and preaching became Biblical, family
life was strengthened and profound improvements in social
manners took place. And England went on to the greatest
period of all in her history. Her decay in the twentieth
century came only with her turning away once again from
those spiritual principles which had made her great.
On one occasion Queen Victoria was asked by a high
ranking foreign diplomat to what she attributed England's
greatness. She turned, pointed to a copy of the Bible,
and said, "that book."
Since the huge problems faced by our country are not,
in the last analysis, technical they cannot be solved by
technical means. For a people who have made technological
materialism a substitute gospel, that is a bitter pill to
swallow, but it must be swallowed if we are to survive.
Ik7

The problem it might "be said, is a "people problem"
and its solution will escape us if we try to use the
methods of a shallow system that has totally and demonstrably
failed to give to America a philosophy that will work in
the latter half of the twentieth century.
The only solution to this cancer in the body politic is
radical surgery. Piecemeal solutions have failed and will
fail. Trying to perfect new methodologies will not work,
nor will better studies of the myriad aspects of the
problem. Neither will appeasement, or trying to be "nice,"
domestically or in our foreign affairs. Increased educa-
tion is not the answer, nor is more money or programs.
Historically, there has been only one means that has ever
been successful in national recovery, and that has been a
return to truth, particularly the truth of God's Word.
No other surgery will work, and we are a textbook example
of trying every other way under the sun only to come, as
now, to frustration and bitterness that our methods have
not worked. Our false prophets have proclaimed, "Peace,
peace" when there was no peace, and have "healed the hurts
of God's people slightly . " Unless we are willing to once
again listen to the voice of our Creator in His Word, and
turn our back on the false prophets leading us to destruc-
tion, the hope of national recovery is non-existent.
How then is this to be done? It is to this all





"and if My people who are called by My name humble them-
selves and pray, and seek My face and turn from their
wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, will forgive
their sin, and will heal their land. 1^9
One of the most common failings in the preaching of
those called to the redemptive evangelism of Jesus Christ
has been to declare, often with force and repetition,
what God's people should do, without telling them how to
do it. As the institutional church in North America became
more secularized and as the political and academic communities
became more religious, the church took on some of the
worse characteristics of the world, and the world took on
some of the worst characteristics of the church. Today,
political "preachers" tell us what we should to but not
how to do it, in ways very reminiscent of their
ecclesiastical counterparts. The observation was made
earlier that secular methods in our government are no
longer working well in a world going awry. And a tried
recipe for debilitating frustration and despair is to be
presented with severe problems, hand in hand with warnings
that solutions are urgently needed, and yet be given no
substantive solutions or, piecemeal suggestions that
constitute little more than sophisticated "patching up" of
crises
.
What is to be done then? Certainly, problems in our
strategic and foreign policy of the magnitude we face at
1^9

the end of the 1970' s demand solutions that are more than
mere bandaging if we are to survive this century as a
nation. Furthermore, those solutions, if they come,
cannot, and will not, be technological. They cannot be
military, and certainly won't be academic or scholarly.
They cannot be economic or even sociological. For the
heart of the problem is in our souls, not in our methods,
even though our methodological problems constitute symptoms
that are significant and severe. The solution must address
the problem where it begins.
How then can recovery from such deep and widespread
social malaise be accomplished without consumming endless
amounts of time?
Even as the theological approach alone provides a
testable means of understanding our problems that has
never failed, so only Biblical theology will provide a
solution that will not betray us in the end. That
Scriptural plan for recovery is straightforward and practical,
and it comes in two distinct dimensions. The preeminent
dimension is the theological, for theology alone provides
a framework of principle for the application of methods
to prevent confusion and provide guidance in battle. The
other dimension concerns the submissive application of
these restorative truths in the various areas of our
national life according to Biblical guidelines, and not




The cornerstone of recovery can be found in Christ's
declaration to the religious leaders of Israel who were
leading that nation to utter destruction even as they
exulted in their intellectual sophistication, despising
the simple folk they governed. J
It is so straightforward as to be potentially repugnant
to a society that prides itself on its sophistication. Yet
it forms the principal basis of all Christ's redemptive
work.
If you abide in My Word, then you are turly
disciples of Mine; and you shall know the truth,
and the truth shall make you free. . .If there-
fore the Son shall make you free, you shall be free
indeed . 151
Freedom from bondage, especially the bondage of sin
we impose upon ourselves by our intellectual fantasies
and philosophical dishonesties, can come only from the
truths of God's Word. All else must be subordinate to
that. In the case of natural recovery, which we so
desperately need, we must return to God's truth as it
deals with our own sinful nature, with the social consequences
of sinful nature unrestrained by Biblical truths, with
the basis upon which God will intervene on behalf of those
who seek Him, and with the means ordained by God.
But where does one start when even the existence of
God, or at least His relevance or knowability, is rejected
by a majority of citizens? The start still must be with
a careful, compassionate and yet honest and full declara-
tion of the truths from Scripture.
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For the person with honest doubts about the value or
efficacy of such an approach, the historical record of
Jonah's experience in calling the great city of Nineveh
to repentance is suggested as a fit subject for prayerful
meditation. Jonah did not even want to go to Nineveh,
much less preach there, but after being singularly
chastenened by the Lord he dutifully went--albeit reluctant-
ly. Upon reaching Nineveh he bagan to declare God's
threatened destruction of the city; that the Lord would
shortly punish it for its wicked ways unless the people
repented. In one of the more remarkable "turnarounds" in
all history, within a few hours of hearing Jonah's message
the whole city, from the King to the least of the beggars,
humbled themselves in sackcloth and ashes, repented of
their sins, sought God's forgiveness, and the city was
spared. Perhaps Jonah's pique at this turn of events can
be explained in part by one's natural (sinful) disappoint-
ment at missing the spectacle of some great pyrotechnic
disaster, and in part by his knowledge that his own country-
men, the chosen race of Israel, had not shown such tender-
ness of heart toward the Lord's admonitions for over a
millenium.
How then is this principle to be applied in the public
and private lives of twentieth century Americans who wouldn'
t
know sackcloth or its significance if they were dressed it in?




The application of Biblical teachings concerning the
implications of our sinful nature, the principles of
responsible statecraft and the standards for societal
harmony must be focused with a compassionate eye upon
the role of the recipients. A politician or Congressman
has a far more immediate and urgent need for understanding
the principles of statecraft than does a housewife in
Kansas. But the housewife nonetheless has an equal need
with the politician to understand something of human nature
in order to know herself, to understand human behavior,
to vote intelligently, and to communicate with her federal
and state representatives in a way that can help them
govern more responsibly.
The place to begin to attack the problem (not the
people having the problem) is to discover those who have
a "listening ear" within the decision-making elite in
and out of the Federal government structure. Men and women
who sincerely desire reform, and who are willing to
participate in reform even if it is personally costly,
are the brightest hope for intersecting the influence of
Biblical truth with the American system. There is abundant
evidence that a hunger exists among many, even in govern-
mental circles, for a "better way." Consider the tremendous
interest and recent involvement of the U.S. government
in tolerating and supporting the propagation of transcendental
meditation, which is simply ancient pagan Hinduism simplified
and secularized for the twentieth century American palate.
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It is a false system, and yet is received gladly by thousands
looking for more meaning in life than that provided by the
cold gospel of materialism. The start of recovery must
be a proclamation of this new Biblical epistemology
(which is really very old) to any who will listen, and
no effort should be spared in patiently teaching and
assisting any who indicate a genuine desire to learn
and to understand.
The focus of such an effort should not be just these
individuals themselves, but also upon their potential for
effecting change. God always has used the instrumentality
of very tiny minorities to guide and stimulate great
transformations for the better, and that wonderfully
encouraging truth holds true today. It has been said,
"God, plus one, is a majority." The recovery effort then
should be to identify and instruct those who are sufficiently
committed to learning (theological) truth and who are
willing to use that truth in confronting and challenging
others. If some of the advisors of the President could
come from such a reservoir of strength, or sip from it, it
is entirely possible that President Carter could move
from his role of timid appeaser and uncertain hunter of a
workable public philosophy. In a sense, it is all too
evident that he does not (and apparently cannot) see the
Presidency in its most fundamental essence. That is that
the President can and should function as a national
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"teacher," and explain to Americans the domestic and
foreign actions of our government in terms that teach
them to participate more meaningfully in their democratic
system of government.
The Biblical truth must be spoken in a spirit of
1 ^2
mature and disciplined redemptive love. J It should
contain two distinct elements. The first must speak
directly to the issue of humanism's failure, to point
out why sociological and psychological methods have failed
Until people are made profoundly uncomfortable with their
present interpretive "system," they are seldom open to
listening to the claims of another. Where there is
evidence of this awareness, then the substantive alternate
of Biblical theology should be offered, in both principle
and application.
The office of the Presidency could effectively teach
a vital Biblical truth. The simple public admission by
the President, that we have been unrighteous and self-
centered in our dealings with our neighbors, and that our
public philosophy has blinded us to certain truths about
ourselves, would be electrifying, even if not necessarily
appreciated by many at first. The admission that we have
turned our backs upon God would not only recapture a lost
spirit of honesty, but encourage many to new reflection.
Sometimes the Lord allows men and nations to discover
the emptiness of their own ways in the hard school of
experience, and this may be true of us. Certainly men
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have been much more receptive to hearing the healing truths
of God's word when they perceive that they have come to
the end of their own resources.
In England's darkest days during the Battle of Britain
an event took place that is virtually forgotten and now
very seldom mentioned. King George VI broadcast on the BBC
to the English people. In that radio address he declared
(or, if you will, confessed) the sins of his nation,
asked Almighty God for forgiveness, and invited the people
to join with him in petitioning God for mercy. Almost
from that very hour Britain's position began to improve.
It is as true today as in 19^-0, or as in the days of
Nineveh, that God resists the proud, but is delighted in
repentance, and pleased to forgive those who come before
Him with humble and contrite hearts, seeking His gracious
1 <3
pardon. v ^
The honest admission of failure and repentance for the
sins of pride, arrogance and intellectual independence will
not be popular at first, and some of the strongest resis-
tance to it will, in all probability, come from segments
of the visible church. But it must be done, and if it is
not, subsequent efforts to correct the problem will not
be blessed. It is the writer's opinion that many Americans
would receive such a declaration with profound relief;
relief at being more honest, relief that we were turning
away from the effort to be our own gods, relief from the
intolerable burden of collective and individual guilt that
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has continually grown as our sins and errors multiply.
Because we are complex beings with mixed motives, it is
even more certain that many would not initially "like" what
they heard, even as they sense the relief that comes when
we "become honest about sin.
Once admission of our self-made misery has been made,
the steps of national recovery must be taken in our
churches, our school and university systems, in the
business world, in our local communities, and in our
personal lives as well as in the halls of the Federal
government
.
This process, beginning with repentance, must include
a (Biblical) study of our nature, and its significance for
society, a (Biblical) study of the basic behavior associated
with recovery, and a study of the Biblical requirements for
God's blessing on nation's and individuals.
The process of recovery, for an individual, or for
individuals on behalf of their country, must include daily
study of God's word, and prayer for His aid. Lest one be
scornful and tempted to dismiss this as the height of
unrealistic irrationality, we should remind ourselves of a
common practice in the early years of our history, when our
first elected officials possessed a spiritual vitality
and vision of statecraft which seems almost legendary in
light of today's frenetic bumblings which sometimes pass
for government leadership. Those State and Federal
assemblies began their legislative sessions with Biblical
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sermons by competent theologicans on the duties and obliga-
tions of statesmen; to God, and to their constituents.
These men were not ashamed to kneel down in those legislative
halls, to pray together for God's help in carrying out
their solemn responsibilities. To gain some insight into
how far we have strayed from this marvellously upbuilding
practice, one only needs to propose the effect, the
consternation, the embarrassment, the uncertainty that would
be experienced by many members of Congress if the President
were to ask the legislators to get down on their knees
with him, and with him pray for the forgiveness of our
national sins! Many would think he had gone mad, and all
kinds of special interest pressure groups and legalistic
gurus would be enraged at such a violation of the current
notion of separation of the church and state.
The scope of this thesis does not permit a detailed
description of the steps for recovery in the many areas of
our national life, should national and public repentance
take place. But unless public confession and supplication
does come to pass, those issues will remain irrelevant.
The heart of the recommendation in this sutdy is that the
problem must be faced, confessed, and God's forgiveness
sought before the day-to-day business of improving our
statecraft, our balance of trade picture, our military
posture, or anything else, can take place.
A final warning. Our problems are not primarily
methodological. They are primarily theological. Changing
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statecraft to a confident, gracious, consistent and firm
undertaking from one of appeasement, vacillation and
weakness is not even an issue of methods. It is an issue
of attitudes, of motivation, and of our basic philosophy.
Thus, gaining theological truth in place of anthropological
error will in itself constitute the greatest and most
powerful factor for change. Where men see the truth
clearly, it is far easier to act in accordance with its
precepts. When men admit that there is such a thing as
absolute truth that can be known, because it comes from an
Absolute God who speaks to us in history, it is far easier
to act with confidence, for one does not need to endlessly
agnonize over each decision and choice. It is liberating
to know that certain things are right because God says
they are. It is certainly liberating, in a good sense
of that old word, to know that it is morally justified for
a nation to defend itself, and that if it defends itself
in the manner and for the reasons God commands in His
Word, then it does not need to fear that the justification
of its actions will fail or its own moral disintegration
result. It is immensely liberating to know that it is
possible (by God's grace) to do right things without
having achieved perfection, or the need to project such
an (impossible) image.
May God, in His great mercy, grant us the eyes to




149. II Chronicles 7:14.
150. It is necessary to recall our general impression of
Rabbinism: its conception of God, and of the highest
good and ultimate object of all things, as concentrated
in learned study, pursued in Academies; and then to
think of the unmitigated contempt with which they
were wont to speak of Galilee, and of the Galileans,
whose very patois was an offence; of the utter
abhorrence with which they regarded the unlettered
country-people, in order to realize, how such a
household as that of Joseph and Mary would be regarded
by the leaders of Israel. A Messianic announcement,
not the result of learned investigation, nor connected
with the Academies, but in the Sanctuary, to a
'rustic' priest; an Elijah unable to untie the
intellectual or ecclesiastical knots, of whose mission,
indeed, this formed no part at all; and a Messiah,
the offspring of a Virgin in Galilee betrothed to a
humble workman--assuredly, such a picture of the
fulfillment of Israel's hope could never have been
conceived by contemporary Judaism. There was in such
a Messiah absolutely nothing
—
past, present or possible,
intellectually, religiously, or even nationally--to
attract, but all to repel. And so we can, at the very
outset of this history, understand the infinite
contrast which it embodied—with all the difficulties
to its reception, even to those who became disciples,
as at almost every step of its progress they were,
with every fresh surprises, recalled from all that
they had formerly thought, to that which was so
entirely new and strange.
Rev. Alfred Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus
the Messiah , Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1906,
Vol. I, pp. 144-145.
151. John 8:31b-32, 36.
152. Ephesians 4:14-16. As a result, we are no longer to
be children tossed here and there by waves, and carried
about by every wind of doctrine, by the trickery of
men, by craftiness in deceitful scheming; but speaking
the truth in love, we are to grow up in all aspects
into Him, who is the head, even Christ, from whom
the whole body, being fitted and held together by
that which every joint supplies, according to the
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proper working each individual part, causes the
growth of the body for the building up of itself in
love
.
153- I John 1:9- If we confess our sins, He is faithful
and righteous to forgive our sins and to cleanse





"Whosoever despises the Word shall be destroyed, but he
that fears the Commandment shall be rewarded. 15^
If we continue our present path, it is certain that in
a few years our government leaders will become immobilized
and unable to govern effectively in the face of growing
domestic and foreign crises, and the increasing complexity
of every issue. As the electorate is given visions of
ever greater expectations about its (presumed) "rights,"
a time will come when the rage of every segment of society
against the government will be such that collapse of the
government and anarchy will result. Our humanistic
philosophy puts the American system of government and
way of life in great peril, because the leaders have
transformed the image of government from that of a God-
appointed servant of the people into a bountiful social
and financial superman who is expected to be all things
to all men. No man or government can succeed forever in
such an act, and when the disillusionment reaches full
maturity, it will be catastrophic. It will make us ripe
for takeover by a ruthless dictator from within or a
stronger opponent from without.
On the other hand, two possibilities may await us,
God willing.
One of these is the possibility that the need to repent
of our intellectual and spiritual evil; of our arrogant
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effort to be free from God and His word; will be recognized
by a significant segment of our intellectual and govern-
mental elite. If there are a few men of real courage,
willing to swim against the flood tide of popular opinion,
in order to declare publicly the truth, there is a real
hope of recovery for the United States. Time and again
in history urgently needed reform has come through the
instrumentality of one, or a very few men, who were utterly
committed to a cause.
The second possibility would be concrete evidence that
the Lord had responded to the prayers of those who have
long been beseeching Him to bring our land to its knees
in repentance and faith. From Scripture we can discern
that this could happen in one of two ways. He could be
pleased to move the Spirit mightily upon our nation, in
conjunction with the proclaimation of His Word, bringing
multitudes under conviction, and a returning to Godly
fear (reverence) . This, of all things, should be the
most fervently desired, for it means restoration and
healing can take place without catastrophic losses.
Or God could be pleased to use the instrumentality of
either, natural disaster or the attack of a stronger enemy
to chasten us sorely. He has declared again and again in
Scripture that without exception, He chastens those whom
He loves, JJ and if we have not turned so completely away
from Him so as to become like Sodom And Gomorrah, then we
will either repent because He calls us to do so, or we
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will repent when He sends some scourging that will bring
us to our knees in spite of ourselves.
Given our present inability to see the obvious (e.g.
our sinful condition) , reinforced by our own self-
propagandizing, the latter of these two is more likely.
God does deal even with people who are hard of heart and
stubborn of will. Still, this is tragic, because even
though "a word of reproof will enter into a wise man more
1*56
than a hundred lashes into a fool," J the majority of us
seemingly fall into the latter category. Surely our most
157fervent prayers should be for our leaders, J[ and for all
of us that God will give each a teachable will and a humble
heart. That is the way of life and there is no other, and
if we refuse all the chastening God sends, we shall be
destroyed in our pride like Israel of old, or more recently






155- Hebrews 12:4—11. You have not yet resisted to the
point of shedding blood, in your striving against
sin; and you have forgotten the exhortation which
is addressed to you as sons, "My son, do not regard
lightly the discipline of the Lord, nor faint when
you are reproved by Him; For those whom the Lord
loves He disciplines, and he scourges every son
whom He receives." It is for discipline that you
endure; God deals with you as with sons; for what
son is there whom his father does not discipline?
But if you are without discipline, of which all have
become partakers, then you are illegitimate children
and not sons. Furthermore, we had earthly fathers
to discipline us, and we respected them; shall we not
much rather be subject to the Father of spirits, and
live? For they disciplined us for a short time as
seemed best to them, but He disciplines us for our
good, that we may share His holiness. All discipline
for the moment seems not to be joyful, but sorrowful;
yet to those who have been trained by it, afterwards
it yields the peaceful fruit of righteousness.
156. Proverbs 17:10. Also, Proverbs 15:10: "Stern
discipline is for him who forsakes the way; He
who hates reproof will die."
157. I Timothy 2:1-3. "First of all, then, I urge that
entreaties and prayers, petitions and thanksgivings,
be made on behalf of all men, for kings and all who
are in authority, in order that we may lead a tranquil
and quiet life in all godliness and dignity. This




AN ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER
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ETHICAL AND MORAL PROBLEMS
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Do Naval Officers, trained to serve in nuclear weapons-
equipped commands, ever entertain "second thoughts" about
the "rightness" of what they are doing? Are nuclear trained
Officers ever troubled by the complex ethical and moral
issues which grow out of the deployment and potential "use"
of thermonuclear weapons? If they do entertain such
thoughts, do these Officers ever discuss them with others,
especially their peers? During the years of schooling
and training which prepare them for these very responsible
assignments, are the awesome ethical and moral ramifica-
tions of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy ever
formally discussed in a systematic fashion for their
psychological, spiritual and intellectual benefit, such
as in a classroom environment?
And what about Military Chaplains who are supposed to
minister to these men - presumably in all areas of their
lives? Do these Chaplains ever deal with the substantive
moral and ethical problems linked to nuclear weapons, or
even seek to structure an opportunity climate wherein such
issues may be honestly and profitably discussed?
Considering the unmeasurable influence the existence
of advanced thermonuclear weapons systems has had upon
the international world order, and upon our society in
particular, is it not logical to suppose that such ethical
16?

questions would occur with some frequency, to nuclear
weapons trained military personnel, especially when one
considers the enormous number of people who, directly or
peripherally, are involved in the development, support
and deployment of such weapons systems?
What is surprising, however, is the virtual silence
on this whole subject within the military establishment.
Is this possibly due to a vast, collective administrative
oversight on the part of those thousands of individuals
occupying leadership positions within this huge military-
civilian system? Or is it possible that mosx nuclear
weapons trained military Officers simply do not think
about such issues? Could it be that such a preponderant
majority of these Officers have so adequately grasped and
worked out all the complex ethical problems inherent in
the existence and potential employment of nuclear weapons
that no further discussion or examination is deemed
necessary? Or could it be that the higher governmental
authorities have so well laid to rest any doubts about the
ethical issues involved in the nuclear weapons policies of
the United States that even a concerned and thoughtful
Officer need not trouble himself with such matters?
At present writing it appears that all four of these
suppositions are patently absurd, and that the answer(s)
to this problem of silence must lie elsewhere.
It was the perception of this troublesome phenomena
which led to the development of an hypothesis attempting
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to explain it. Could it be reasonably supposed that
nuclear weapons trained Officers in the three major ser-
vices d_o think about - and even agonize over - some of the
ethical and moral problems inherent in the deployment of
nuclear weapons? And could it be reasonably supposed, in
addition, that for one or more reasons this whole matter
is simply not discussed and/or admitted?
Shortly after I was assigned as a student to the
National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Post-
graduate School in Monterey a providential opportunity
arose for exploring the validity of this two-fold hypothesis,
This opportunity took the form of a course in Military
Sociological Analysis, in which one part of the course
requirements was some kind of original research effort
directed toward military personnel. A legitimate occasion
for circulating a research questionnaire amongst a care-
fully selected group of Officer students attending the
Postgraduate School could thus be submitted for approval
to the School's administration. Once this permission to
circulate the questionnaires was given, the task of
respondent selection and survey distribution and collection
was facilitated by the gracious assistance of the curriculum
Officers of the several participating Academic Departments.
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II. DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
By virtue of the very limited span of applicability and
interest addressed in the survey, it was NOT conducted on
a random basis, rather being designed to solicit attitudes
from a very specific group of military officers, namely,
one's who had already served in nuclear equipped commands
and who, in some way or other, had been personally respon-
sible for one or more aspects of the tactical planning,
maintainence , security readiness associated with deployed
nuclear weapons. These included officers from the sub-
marine, surface, ASW and air attack communities. In
other words, the intent was to survey Officers who had had
some degree of actual 'hands on' experience with nuclear
weapons, rather than simply a theoretical exposure.
Inasmuch as the subject of nuclear weapons is sensitive
in nearly all respects and, furthermore, is fraught with
security considerations, the survey instrument was designed
to gather information concerning past and present attitudes
toward thinking about this matter; to discover possible
interest in further discussion; and to avoid at all costs
any suggestion of seeking classified information, as such.
Apparently this intent was fundamentally successful, for
only two respondents commented to the effect that answering
one or more of the questions in their opinion would be
improper for them on the basis os security considerations.
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It was also a primary concern that no specific ethical
position be solicited, or a given ethical bias be suggested,
in the way the questions themselves were worded. Rather,
the primary purpose was to discover if any significant
discussion or consideration of ethical and/or moral issues
related to muclear weapons had taken place at all in the
officer's experience and, if so, under what conditions
regardless of what that particular position might have
been. The only conscious bias purposely reflected in the
wording of the questions was the presupposition that there
are indeed 'problems' (but in no way specifically identified)
associated with the deployment and theoretical use of
nuclear weapons.
From (this writer's) readings in various areas of the
strategic debate, there is apparently a remarkable degree
of agreement among many authors that there are, indeed,
ethical and moral problems associated with the existence
of nuclear weapons, irrespective of their position on the
spectrum of opinion in the debate. Just what those ethical
problems are is quite a different matter, and there is a
great deal of disagreement about this in the aforementioned
literature
.
Four demographic questions were included at the end,
and all but two of those returning the questionnaire in-
cluded this information as well. It was distributed to




The survey instrument, with its cover letter, is




III. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
At the suggestion of the National Security Affairs
Department Curricular Officer, the assistance of the
Curricular Officers in several other Departments was
sought in order to identify officers who had been assigned
to at least one nuclear equipped command prior to report-
ing to the Postgraduate School as well as distributing
the questionnaires themselves. This undoubtedly contributed
significantly to the high percentage of survey answer sheets
returned - 11% (124 out of 175 distributed).
A number of interesting comments were added by many
of the respondants and, with few exceptions, these will be
included in this assessment, though only in a generalized
or summary form.
Most questionnaires were returned anonymously. Of
those replying to question #1, 7Jfo indicated that they
had not been exposed to any discussion or examination of
ethical or moral problems related to nuclear weapons in all
their college years. Of those who said "yes" (27$)
i
nearly all qualified this with comments indicating that
such discussions had taken place in civilian colleges and/
or in conjunction with philosophy, political science or
related courses. A few mentioned that they had participated
in informal discussions of the subject.
In responding to question #2, 81# indicated that they
had not been exposed to any consideration of the ethical/
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moral dimensions of nuclear weapons in any part of their
subsequent military training 1 Of those who said "yes"
about half added the explanation that such discussion had
taken place on an informal basis, not in a classroom.
Many of the remarks indicated that the ethical issues
addressed in these talks primarily concentrated on the
ethics of killing, and war in general, vice just nuclear
warfare. Several dismissed any implication if uniqueness
by saying that the nuclear weapons issue was just a case
of a "bigger weapon."
Question #3 provided the biggest surprise of the whole
survey, with an amazing 97% indicating they had no ethical
problems whatsoever with the possible use of nuclear weapons!
This question produced the fewest comments of any of the
six questions, with only 14 adding any remarks beyond a
"yes" or "no" answer.
Several raised the question as to whether they were
being asked about a first or second strike, which is very
significant from an ethical standpoint, since high level
perceptions of the American cultural values system has
profoundly affected strategic planning with respect to
the first or second strike problem.
Undoubtedly, the most significant insight to emerge
from this questionnaire was that, in spite of the fact
that nearly all the respondents claimed to have "no"
problem with the use of nuclear weapons, many subsequently
called this "no" into question, either by their answers
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to this or the other questions, or by additional summary
comments that obviously contradicted that negative declara-
tion! For example, one "no" on #3 respondent added this
final comment. "This questionnaire deals with questions
that really should not be decided at these low levels.
It also assumes nuclear weapons are immoral which is a
relative question." And from another, "no" on #3, in
his answer to #6, "yes I would. As a matter of fact,
it would be nice to have some guidance on the moral and
ethical problems of any form of armed conflict." Another,
answering "no" then immediately continues, "but for the
weapons I was associated with our only target would have
been submarines. I have never been associated with nor
considered the question of strategic nuclear weapons and
their use. I have always felt that the tactical weapon
I was associated with would save many more lives than it
took."( !)
In brief, what emerged here was indirect evidence,
sometimes quite clear, that the "no" answer for #3 simply
was not accurate or encompassing all aspects of the issue.
There was almost an even split on question #4. Those
who said they had never perceived this subject to be a
problem for any other personnel comprised 52% of all
replying. Of those who said they did perceive a problem
as described, nearly fifty out of the 60 "yes" answered
that it was enlisted personnel that had a problem(s),
often adding explanations to the effect that it was not
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really an objection to nuclear weapons, per se, but to
war in general; the possibility of killing somebody
(especially a shipmate) while on guard duty; or simply
using this broad issue as a means of manipulation to get
out of extra work. A very few did mention conscientious
objectors in this connection.
When asked if they had ever been sought out for
guidance or help in this matter, 12% said "no," and some
of those responding affirmatively commented that it had
been in the context of an informal discussion (such as in
a wardroom)
.
Finally, out of 12^ replying to question 6, only two
(l.ofo) indicated by "yes" that they had ever been approached
or counselled about this subject by a Chaplain! Only two
comments were received on this first part of #6, of the
120 who replied to the second half of the question, 7W°
indicated no desire to have any guidance on this matter
from a Chaplain. Of the 26$ who made a positive response
over half included a caveat - that is, they would like
to discuss the subject, on their initiative, but did not
want to be "guided." A few said that Chaplains possessed
insufficient information on this subject to be of any use
in such counselling, and two individuals perceived such
an eventuality as a real threat to security. Several
raised the question whether it was even proper to consider
such matters at this level at all.
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Nearly all of those who returned the survey forms
indicated that they were Navy Officers, with two Army
and two Air Force Officers bringing the total to 12^.
The average years in service worked out to 10.1, indicating
that the majority were approximately in mid-career.
Once the questionnaires were returned, I engaged in
extended conversations with most of those who identified
themselves and indicated a desire for such a dialogue.
Without exception, these disucssions supported the con-




Some of the conclusions of this preliminary analysis
are admittedly tentative, and an exhaustive computerized
correlation of data has not been undertaken. No apology
is made for summarizing implications or references contained
in the comments since these are very difficult to quantify.
What trends or patterns are sufficiently clear in this
data to identify without the benefit of a full scale
statistical analysis?
First of all it is clearly apparent that there is
virtually a total absence of any in-depth, guided discussion
of these grave issues at the Service Academy or Officer
training levels. With few exceptions among those who
chose to comment, most indicated that they dealt with the
(unspecified and therefore assumed) ethical problems in-
volved in nuclear weapons by the presumption that those
in authority over them - the leaders who someday might
give the order to fire the weapons - would have already
made the correct ethical and moral decisions relative to
such an eventuality. Their job was seen as simply remain-
ing totally reliable with respect to obeying orders, even
if the "ultimate one" was given. Possibly this outlook
is an institutionalized example of our national tendency
to perpetuate long observed trends and traditions, even
when the reason for them is unclear or forgotten.
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Apparently the subject of ethics as related to nuclear
weapons policy is taboo, not only at the Academy level,
but in operational commands as well. The degree of emotional
sensitivity to this issue is perhaps hinted at by those
who commented that the questionnaire was implying (assuming?)
that the use of nuclear weapons was immoral, period. Another
possible indicator of sensitivity was the hostile and/or
defensive remarks of some respondents. Statements of this
sort, including one which explicitly asserted that this
writer needed immediate counselling to correct his basic
failure to understand the subject, inferred that there is
an underlying, and seldom admitted, uneasiness about the
whole subject which seems to belie the nearly unanimous
denial of any problems at all in this area.
Apparently the most common means of dealing with the
problem is to assume that the leaders of the country have
already thought the problem through adequately, and if an
order comes to launch, it will therefore be "right."
Some reflected this underlying assumption rather succinctly,
if not delicately, with "better them than us."
Remembering that these answers come entirely from a
group of mature and presumably above average in intelligence
and performance Line Officers, entering the most productive
and significant years of their career, it is more than
interesting to note that the vast majority claimed no
ethical problems whatsoever with the possible use of
nuclear weapons, and only l&fo of those contacted by means
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of the questionnaire were willing to discuss the matter.
What appears to be the most significant area suggested
for further study by the data is the apparent paradox which
emerged from the fact pattern of many of the "no" answers
to question #3 essentially contradicted by additional
remarks there or elsewhere.
Finally, it is obvious that the Chaplain Corps, almost
without exception, is simply not seen by these individuals
as having any real significance for them when it comes
to matters this complex and deep theologically and




Our present military education and training not only
prepares Officers for highly technical responsibilities,
but for exceedingly demanding leadership challenges.
However, any really substantive effort to expose these
Officers (who, presumably, are thinking men) to the
admittedly difficult and complex subject of the ethical
overtones inherent in the strategic nuclear posture of our
country is almost entirely avoided either by intent or
default. For the most part this appears to be a minimally
satisfactory state of affairs as long as things continue
as they are, in that initiating extensive reflection on
this matter while an Officer is functioning in an operational,
nuclear equipped command could be argued as possibly im-
pairing his psychological and emotional readiness and
reliability. Not doing so during Academy years may be due
to nothing more than bureaucratic inertia or simple de-
fault in failing to come to grips with the critical importance
of this whole matter for Officer candidates. What I have
here called the unspoken "taboo" against in-depth considera-
tion may possibly reflect a vitally important emotional
defense mechanism for those who must live with the daily
strain of the awful possibility of having to someday
launch these awesome weapons of destruction hand in hand
with an insufficient or non-existent philosophical-theological
framework for making major decisions and moral choices.
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One glaringly weak link in this chain of seemingly
reasonable suppositions is the assumption that in all
conflict circumstances there would be sufficiently clear
political decisions so that the only "value" question a
commanding officer would ever have to decide was whether
a message to launch was genuine or not. This in turn rests
on another assumption, namely, that adequate communication
would continue to exist in the terrible eventuality of
the failure of deterrance. It is difficult indeed to
believe that such assumptions are altogether reasonable
given present uncertainties about our ability to maintain
command control and communications if a counterforce
preemptive first strike was sustained by this country.
Military Chaplains did not fare well in this matter
at the hands of their Line Officer brethren, and it is
most unlikely that the fault rests entirely with either
group. On the part of the Chaplains, there has been an
unmistakable trend in recent years to concentrate ministry
in the role of the activist, healer, reconciler and "caring
person" - one who is deeply involved with his people in a
"ministry of presence." This emphasis on involvement, and
programs, while much of it was both needed and commendable,
has nevertheless developed at the expense of
theological substance, and a clear perception of the
activity of a pastor in attempting to provide answers to
eternal issues based on something other than personal
experience and feeling. Indeed, there is currently a
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sizable segment of the American Clergy which denies, either
actively or by implication, that there are any substantive,
eternally valid answers at all to transcendant and abstract
issues. In such a context it is scarcely surprising that
the supremely difficult ethical task of relating eternal
and spiritual issues to the hydra-headed problem of de-
fining the issues of the national interest, and the nuclear
policy debate in particular, should be avoided almost
universally, whether consciously or unconsciously. In
modern America in the 1970 ' s it is simply not normative
to see a pastor's primary responsibility as the proclama-
tion of objective truth based on testable documentary
evidence - to theologize, in other words. Philosophy has
shown us the utter fruitlessness of trying to construct
an ethical system without any absolute presuppositions upon
which it can rest, and as a result, ethical discussions
not only seldom occur in our culture (at the time of the
Watergate scandal there was not a single law school left
in the United States which had retained a course in the
ethics of jurisprudence in its curriculum) , but most
Americans no longer have any abstract, conceptual base
for moral decisions other than personal 'feelings'.
Coupling this cultural phenonemon with the significant
technological and political issues (nearly all complex)
attendant on the whole subject of nuclear weapons, it is
scarcely surprising that the dialogue almost never occurs
in the Navy, even with the Chaplains around! That is
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just too much to expect unless there are radical changes
in commitment and grounding on the part of pastors serving
in uniform.
On the part of Line Officers, there are understandable
apprehensions about opening up this subject for discussion
at all. Much of the data relating to the destructive
potential of thermonuclear weapons is classified, and if
a Chaplain were to discuss such matters, should he be
surprised if some would question whether he was sufficiently
knowledgeable to be credible? This seems, however, to beg
the question, for the real ethical and moral problems
associated in most writings with the deployment and possible
use of these weapons is not linked to fine tuning technical
data nearly so much as to cultural values and perceptions
about political and foreign policy choices which affect
this issue. Here it is well to note that many respondents
commented that a Chaplain, to counsel effectively in this
area, would have to have some grasp of the relevant technical
and policy issues.
In addition, many of these Line Officers indicated
that they didn't need any counseling, but a Chaplain was
certainly fine for the (needy) enlisted man. That such
elitist attitudes should manifest extreme defensiveness
in an area that is traditionally their exclusive 'preserve'
was scarcely surprising, either, when it has consistently
been the experience of this writer that many commissioned
Officers, in all kinds of circumstances, have opined that
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the Chaplain was a wonderful asset to have around - for
the enlisted folk!
One fascinating and profitable benefit that evolved
out of this survey, and which is only barely reflected
in the raw data, was the extensive conversations with
several interested respondants who, unsolicited, asked to
discuss the subject further. In every instance these
individuals manifested an atypical willingness to face the
hard questions, including ones that could be construed as
threatening to their career, demonstrating that they had
done considerable thinking about ethical questions even
though, in most cases, they had not engaged in much discussion
about them. Out of these verbal exchanges, as well as the
questionnaires, per se, there emerged a tentative conclusion
about the way in which this whole issue should be taken up.
All of those who wanted to discuss the survey after-
wards agreed that an honest and competent discussion was
highly desirable, but not in the environment of an
operational command. Several written comments support this
position wherein such discussion raised the fear of eroding
reliability in personnel, and possibly jeopardizing a
career (at least in the case of officers) . These same
individuals also tended to exert a greater degree of
concern about the subject than was indicated in the survey.
Generally, there was agreement that the subject could
probably be addressed in a non-threatening manner if it





In conclusion, there appears to be compelling evidence
in this survey that the majority of nuclear weapons trained
Naval Officers (Army and Air Force too?) do not see them-
selves as struggling with any ethical problems in their
area of expertise - or at least not demonstrating the
willingness to admit such concern if they are partly or
fully conscious of it! Additionally there emerged compelling
evidence of the existence of a taboo within the Navy
that even Chaplains are party to, namely that these awkward
and difficult moral and ethical questions are, with few
exceptions, simply not discussed. If this is indeed a
correct hypothesis, it could account, in part, for the
Vietnam war phenomenon of the almost total silence of
Navy Chaplains on the ethical problems in that conflict,
whilst their civilian brethren held a virtual monopoly on
such discussions "back home."
Finally, notwithstanding the problem of the "taboo,"
and our cultural tendency to suppress difficult and painful
matters that seem to preclude any easy answers, there
appeared to be significant indications in the data of
concern about the ethical problems of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons policy, even if obliquely expressed. In-
deed, it might not be too strong to call it a "hunger"
for a greater degree of certainty about what is truly the





If even one of these conclusions is demonstratably
true and therefore valid, and if one reflects, even casually,
on the shattering repercussions and international consequences
of the wrong use - or non use - of nuclear weapons, then
the failure to honestly and maturely face, consider,
discuss and wrestle with these issues, somewhere , in the
military experience of these officers becomes an indefensible
sin of omission, both with respect to these men themselves,
and to the larger society they serve.
If nothing else, the escalating complexity of our
own technology, increasingly complicating these issues,
may force us to take a more responsible look at deductive
and transcendent principles as the only hope for a mature
and responsible nuclear policy and for a credible conceptual
framework from which to assist our military men to think
carefully and responsibily about these "unthinkable"
problems. An absolute minimal expression of appropriate
responsibility should include a significant long term
commitment on the part of the Navy - but not in another
"programme" (God forbid!) - to provide a structural, non
career threatening, opportunity for nuclear trained
Officers, to systematically address, discuss and think
about these issues somewhere within the context of al-
ready existing "training or schooling commands. Can we,




Three recommendations appear appropriate for considera-
tion at this time, in light of the above.
First - there should be a class, at the Naval Academy
which specifically addresses these problems before an
Officer candidate has finalized his career choice or has
been attached to an operational command.
Secondly - there should be a subsequent more intense
course centering on the ethical issues of nuclear weapons
policy, available to Officers in their mid-career years,
in an environment such as the Naval War College or Post-
graduate School. Nearly all those who requested further
discussion strongly indicated they would very much like to
take such a course if the opportunity were made available
to them, but not in an operational command. The emotional
and intellectual drain would be too great hand-in-hand
with the multitudinous responsibilities common to Officers
at this level of responsibility. Some suggested that such
an introductory course at the Academy level could signifi-
cantly diminish the emotional shock an individual sometimes
experiences when the awesome consequences of any use of
nuclear weapons does dawn upon him - something that sometimes
occurs several years after the Academy experience.
Thirdly - such a course must have at least one
individual who has enough of a grasp of the technical
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realities to understand some of the questions a Line Officer
would have from that perspective as well as the philosophical
qualifications. Possibly such a course could be 'team
taught* by several individuals whose collective qualifica-
tions would cover the spectrum of related areas, including
metaphysics, theology, philosophy, ethics and the physics
of atomic weapons effects. Nor should such a course be
taught primarily by an individual whose own moral position
is at one or the other (simplistic) ends of the nuclear
debate spectrum (viz. a unilateral disarmament pacifist or
a preemptive 'first strike hawk' who would like to "nuke
'em back into the stone age").
As our Navy grows ever more sophisticated, and
operational Line Officers are given ever more command
accountability, and the unknown possibilities in a possible
nuclear exchange are increasingly complex - and therefore
unclear - it is absurd to assume that men of this level
of intelligence will simply not think about the problems
related to the use of the weapons they carry. The
Russians have no qualms about indoctrination of their
Officers, including the most ultimate strategic possibilities,
and this in spite of their historical paranoia about re-
vealing too much information even to their own people.
At the very least we should provide a reasonable opportunity
for those officers who are interested in thinking further
and more responsibly about these matters which go to the
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very heart of the reason for their military role. When
and if we take such a step as a Navy, it will indicate a










A few moments of your time, and the giving of careful
thought to the attached questions, is earnestly requested.
Please allow me first to explain. The Chaplain's Corps
of the Navy has tasked me with studying the ethical and
moral aspects of nuclear weapons and strategy. One of
the purposes of such a study includes the commitment to
improve the ministry of Chaplains to Navy men and women in
nuclear related fields. Your willingness to carefully
answer as completely as you can will be deeply appreciated.
Should you be interested in the final results of this
survey, I shall be pleased to share this information with
you if you leave a 3 x 5 card for me, with your name on
it, in the National Security Affairs Curricular Office.






1. In your college, academy and/or technical training, were
the moral and ethical problems of (possible) nuclear
war ever discussed or examined?
If so , in what way?
2. In your general military training, were you in any way
exposed to a consideration of the ethical and/or
moral aspects of nuclear weapons?
If so , in what way?
3- Was the issue of the ethics involved in the possible
use of nuclear weapons ever a problem for you since
coming into the military service?
If so , in what way?
k. Did you ever perceive this to be a problem for other
personnel with whom you were associated (e.g. young
enlisted personnel in the 'Reliability Programme')?
5- Has any member of the military ever come to you for
discussion, guidance or help in this matter?
If so , what did you do or say?
6. Did any Chaplain ever discuss any significant part of
this subject with you?
If not, would you have desired any such guidance from
a Chaplain in this area:
Optional demographic questions:
1. Are you a member of the Army Navy Air Force ?
2. How long have you been in the Service? years.
3- Religious preference, if any .
k. Service specialty (or designation) .
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